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ABSTRACT 
The problems Yemen faces today seem insurmountable.  The geographic divisions 
widened by imperialism were cemented by Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh.  His 
heavy-handed suppression of the Houthi rebellion on the border with Saudi Arabia, the 
Southern secessionist movement, and the Arab Spring protesters delegitimized the regime 
in the eyes of the Yemeni people.  With President Saleh at the helm, water and oil 
resources were squandered and mismanaged.  Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP) has found this volatile, ungoverned environment a welcome area in which to 
recruit, equip, train, and conduct operations.  That their antagonistic narrative continues 
to find a welcome audience in the tribal areas of Yemen and their securing of safe havens 
is testament to the failed policies of the Saleh regime.   
The United States has focused on eradicating AQAP since the beginning of the 
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).  In its counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign against 
AQAP, the United States has focused almost all its effort in working with the Yemeni 
government.  While enjoying a modicum of success, this success has been limited to the 
elimination of AQAP operatives through kinetic strikes.  Moreover, the gains were 
tempered by President Saleh, who at times acted in direct opposition to America’s goals 
of eradicating AQAP.   His recent removal will likely do little to counter the array of 
problems Yemen faces.   
In this light, America’s foreign policy toward Yemen and AQAP is inadequate in 
securing our regional interests and needs to be overhauled.  To delineate which COIN 
practices may work best, an investigation of past COIN campaigns was conducted.  
Malaya, Nicaragua, and Somalia were chosen to provide the widest possible range of 
tactics used in fighting an insurgency where the host nation government is illegitimate, 
and represent both success and failure.  These three case studies formed the basis of three 
courses of action:  working with the government, circumventing the government and 
working directly with the tribes, and assisting in the state failure.  While all three courses 
of action have merit, only the third course of action addresses the root causes of the 
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problems in Yemen.  For this reason, the only way to eliminate AQAP as a threat to the 
United States is to work through the Yemeni tribes without the central government acting 
as a roadblock. 
  
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................1 
B. YEMEN AND THE DUTIES OF THE STATE ...........................................2 
C. THE PERILS OF CURRENT COIN DOCTRINE ......................................5 
D. AQAP AND U.S. INTERESTS .......................................................................6 
E. METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................6 
1. Chapter II:  Yemen as a Failing State ................................................7 
2. Chapter III:  Analysis of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula .........7 
3. Chapter IV:  Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice .................7 
4. Chapter V:  Case Study Analysis .......................................................8 
5. Chapter VI:  Policy Recommendations and Conclusion ..................8 
II. YEMEN .........................................................................................................................9 
A. YEMEN:  HISTORICAL CONTEXT ...........................................................9 
1. Yemen and Imperial Hubris – The Delineation of Geographical 
and Tribal Fractures............................................................................9 
2. Saleh and the Road to Disunity.........................................................13 
3. How to Lose Friends and Alienate People – Divide and 
Conquer? ............................................................................................14 
B. YEMEN’S RESOURCE PROBLEMS – OIL, WATER, AND 
DEMOGRAPHICS ........................................................................................18 
1. Manifestation of Tensions – The Southern Secessionist 
Movement ...........................................................................................20 
2. Manifestation of Tensions – The Houthi Rebellion ........................21 
3. Manifestation of Tensions – The Arab Spring in Yemen ...............21 
4. The Growth of AQAP ........................................................................23 
C. YEMEN AND U.S. INTERESTS .................................................................23 
III. AL-QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA (AQAP).......................................27 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................27 
B. GENESIS ........................................................................................................27 
C. THE MERGER AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE ....................30 
D. THE AQAP NARRATIVE............................................................................31 
E. AQAP OPERATIONS AND LIMITATIONS ............................................34 
F. LIMITED SUCCESS POINTS TO THE NEED FOR A NEW 
POLICY TOWARD YEMEN .......................................................................37 
IV. COIN DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE .....................................................................39 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................39 
B. DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE .............................................................40 
C. COUNTERING THE GROWTH .................................................................41 
1. David Galula .......................................................................................42 
2. David Kilcullen ...................................................................................44 
3. FM 3–24: Counterinsurgency ...........................................................46 
 viii 
D. TYING IT ALL TOGETHER ......................................................................48 
V. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS .......................................................................................53 
A. NICARAGUA: THE FALL OF SOMOZA .................................................53 
1. Nicaragua Introduction .....................................................................53 
2. Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional ......................................53 
3. Somoza’s Government Fails the People ...........................................54 
4. The People Rise Up, the Insurgents Take Control..........................55 
5. Nicaragua Conclusion ........................................................................56 
B. MALAYA:  THE BRITISH SUCCESS STORY ........................................57 
1. Malaya Introduction ..........................................................................57 
2. Malayan Communist Party ...............................................................57 
3. The British Return .............................................................................58 
4. British COIN Operations – First Phase ...........................................59 
5. British COIN Operations – Second Phase .......................................59 
6. Malaya Conclusion.............................................................................61 
C. SOMALIA: THE FAILURE OF A STATE ................................................62 
1. Somalia Introduction .........................................................................62 
2. Re-identification of the Population...................................................62 
3. Insurgent Groups Emergence ...........................................................64 
4. Barre Fails to Defeat Insurgents .......................................................64 
5. Somalia Conclusion ............................................................................66 
D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................66 
VI. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................69 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................69 
B. COIN SUPPORTING THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT .......................72 
1. Required Actions ................................................................................73 
2. Recommendation................................................................................74 
C. GRASSROOTS COIN AT THE VILLAGE/TRIBE LEVEL ...................75 
1. Required Actions ................................................................................75 
2. Recommendation................................................................................77 
D. ASSIST IN FALL OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT........................77 
1. Required Actions ................................................................................77 
2. Recommendation................................................................................80 
E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................80 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................83 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................89 
 
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. North and South Yemen (From Carnegie Endowment). .................................11 
Figure 2. Kilcullen Three Pillar Model  (From Air University). .....................................44 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AQAP   al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
AQAY   al-Qaeda in Yemen 
 
BN   Battalion  
 
COA   Course of Action 
COIN   Counterinsurgency 
CT   Counterterrorism  
 
DoD   Department of Defense 
 
FLOSY  Front for the Liberation of Southern Yemen 
FM   Field Manual 
FSLN Sandinista Front for National Liberation (Frente Sandinista de 
Liberacion Nacional) 
 
GCC   Gulf Cooperation Council 
GO   Governmental Organization 
GWOT  Global War on Terror 
 
HN   Host Nation 
 
IO   Information Operations 
 
MCP   Malayan Communist Party 
ME   Middle East 
MPAJA  Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army 
 
NGO   Non-Governmental Organization 
NLF   National Liberation Front 
 
PDRY   People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen 
PETN   Pentaerythritol Tetranitrate   
 
SNM   Somali National Movement 
SRP   Supreme Revolutionary Council  
SSDF   Somali Salvation Defense Front 
 
UN   United Nations 
USC   United Somali Congress  
 
YAR   Yemen Arab Republic 
YSP   Yemen Socialist Party 
 xiv 




Major Jarrod J.H. Gillam: 
 I would like to take this opportunity to thank the faculty and staff in the Defense 
Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Your assistance and guidance 
has made this opportunity worthwhile and enlightening.  I would like to thank Professor 
George Lober for introducing this topic to James and myself.  Without your class we 
would not have written this thesis.  To our advisors: Drs. Heather Gregg, Glenn Robinson 
and Hy Rothstein, I want to thank you each personally for your time and efforts, without 
which we would not have been able to complete such a high quality product.  To my 
family and friends I want to say thank you for your support during this time.  The 
challenges you helped me overcome were immeasurable.  Most importantly I want to 
thank my girlfriend, Wendy Farnsworth.  Your support and understanding when I had to 
“leave to study and get work done” has been the most appreciated.  I wouldn’t have been 
able to get to accomplish this without you.  Thank you.   
 
Major James E. Moran: 
To my wife, Courtney, who is the love of my life and keeps me headed in the 
right direction.  To my boys, Taylor, Sean, and Kevin, who bring me endless joy.  
Finally, a special thanks to my Mom, Dad, and my brother John, who are the examples to 
which I aspire. 
 xvi 




 Yemen is a country in turmoil.  The Houthi rebellion on the border with Saudi 
Arabia, the Southern secessionist movement, and the growth of Al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP) are the physical manifestations of deeper issues within the country.  
The poor use of dwindling natural resources, the pervasive use of selective patronage 
toward the tribes and clans within its borders, and the lack of good governance are among 
the issues which the Saleh regime faced, and did little to counter.  The dramatic rise of 
anti-government sentiment and the rapidly dwindling economy have dramatically 
weakened the Yemeni state.  Additionally, the policies of President Saleh seem to have 
been chosen based on the importance of regime survival rather than Yemeni prosperity.  
Unfortunately for President Saleh, the forces arrayed against him were too powerful to be 
ignored.  On November 23, 2011, he signed a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-brokered 
deal by which he agreed to step down from power in exchange for immunity from 
prosecution.1  The policies of President Saleh’s 33-year rule resulted in large swaths of 
ungoverned and undergoverned territory, enabling AQAP to increase its power and 
influence in the region.  While the United States has demonstrated its resolve in helping 
Yemen counter AQAP, the lack of a clear U.S. strategy toward Yemen, coupled with 
American COIN doctrine, which does not provide a clear roadmap on how to conduct 
COIN with or on behalf of a weak or illegitimate state, has produced uneven results.  
With the realization that the central government in Yemen has been ineffective in 
countering AQAP, how can the United States craft new policies in order to deny AQAP 
the ability of to harm the interests of the United States?  Are there past COIN practices 
that have been implemented with, or on behalf of, a weak or illegitimate government that 
can form that basis of this new policy? 
 In order to determine the most effective course of action (COA) for the United 
States with respect to the myriad of problems in Yemen, a systematic exploration of the 
                                                 
1 Vice President Abd-Rabbua Mansour Hadi announced that elections will be held in February 2012. 
 2 
causes of volatility within the country must be completed.  This is especially relevant in 
light of the recent dramatic increase in (and government suppression of) protest activity.  
As such, while the U.S. has focused on AQAP as the most pressing threat from Yemen, 
the possibility of regional instability due to a failed regime should also be considered.  
The return of President Saleh from Saudi Arabia2 did not preclude this possibility, and 
only served to feed the flames of discord among the disaffected in Yemen.  Whoever 
takes the reins of power in Yemen will face these same problems.  As a result, a 
description of U.S. interests as well as a description of current U.S. involvement in the 
region is also warranted.  With a clear vision of the geopolitical and sociological 
landscape in Yemen, a look at past counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts where weak states 
faced insurgencies will be explored in order to glean best practices for possible inclusion 
into overall U.S. and military policy recommendations.  To that end, and because of the 
relatively large body of literature dealing with the case study countries, Malaya, 
Nicaragua and Somalia will be included in the study.  The policy recommendations made 
in this paper should thus apply not only to Yemen, but to other countries where a weak 
state has been detrimental to U.S. efforts. 
B. YEMEN AND THE DUTIES OF THE STATE 
 The lack of effective governing mechanisms and practices in Yemen are well 
documented.  However, in order to ascertain the level of poor governance in Yemen, a 
look at what a state should do to support its population must be delineated.  The duties of 
the state towards its population are rooted in the tradition that the governing institutions 
must provide for the basic welfare of the people within its borders and, in return, the 
people support the government, providing the legitimacy for governance.  According to 
Ghani, Lockhart, and Carnahan, there are ten specific areas on which the state should 
focus, listed in Table 1.3 
 
                                                 
2 President Saleh returned to Yemen from Saudi Arabia on September 23, 2011, where he had been 
receiving medical care for injuries sustained in attacks from protesters on June 3, 2011. 
3 Ashraf Ghani, Clare Lockhart and Michael Carnahan, “Closing the Sovereignty Gap:  An Approach 
to State-Building,” Overseas Development Institute, London, September 2005, 6. 
 3 
Table 1.   State Focus Areas (From Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan, 2005). 
  
It is certainly true that not all nation-states in the world are equally adept at – or 
capable of - fulfilling each of the ten duties listed above.  There are some who argue that 
the history of Yemen precludes the emergence of a strong, viable nation state capable of 
effectively governing the country.  According to Barrett, “Every ideological group, tribe, 
clan, and sect wraps itself in its own version of Yemeni identity, leading inextricably to a 
recurring cycle of conflict that makes chronic instability the norm in political and 
economic life.”4  Unfortunately, in addition to the problems beyond the control of its 
leadership such as the sociological landscape and rapidly dwindling natural resources, the 
Yemeni government is acting counter to most, if not all, of the duties of the nation with 
respect to its population.  Thus, while many authors argue that due to its historical 
context Yemen is not a proper nation-state, the sheer power of the Yemeni central 
government dictates that it act in the best interests of the entire citizenry of the country, 
but chooses to act only on behalf of those who contribute to his power over the country.  
Thus, with respect to the duties of the nation to its people, the Saleh regime failed much 
of the population on most counts. 
For example, Ghani (quoting from Weber) says that a monopoly on the means of 
violence is the primary criterion for statehood.  However, it is often reduced, especially in 
a weak state, to “a simple monopoly on violence and then to little more than control of a 
                                                 
4 Roby C. Barrett, “Yemen:  A Different Political Paradigm in Context,” Joint Special Operations 
University Report 11–3, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, May 2011, 4. 
Legitimate monopoly on the means of violence Administrative Control 
Management of public finances Investment in human capital 
Delineation of citizenship rights and duties Provision of infrastructure services 
Formation of the market Management of the state’s assets (including the 
environment, natural resources, and cultural assets) 
International relations (including entering into 
international contracts and public borrowing) 
Rule of law 
 4 
capital city.”5  A monopoly on the means of violence simply means that the government 
is the controlling authority within the country in terms of providing security for the nation 
– both from threats from external actors and from those within the nation who seek to 
harm it.  In Yemen, the monopoly on the means of violence serves to delegitimize the 
government by providing security for only a select portion of the population.  In other 
words, while a portion of the population benefits from the security provided by the state, 
there is a corresponding segment of the population which not only does not benefit from 
state security, but whose safety and security are actually taken away by the very 
institutions which are supposed to protect them.   
There have been many instances where the Yemeni government has abused its 
monopoly on violence.  First, the Saleh regime recruited fighters from certain tribes to 
participate in the fight against the Houthis.6  By doing so, Saleh was not only better able 
to suppress the rebellion, but he also divided and weakened the tribes, making them less 
capable of posing any sort of threat to the central government.  This abuse of power is 
highlighted by the fact that to refuse to supply fighters at Saleh’s request would most 
certainly have resulted in a reduction in patronage received by the tribes.  A more recent 
example was seen in March of 2011, when snipers killed more than fifty and injured 
hundreds of demonstrators in Taghyir Square in Sana’a (the capital of Yemen) who were 
trapped in the square by burning tires.  Most of the gunshot wounds were to the heads or 
chests of the protestors, indicating that the shooters were professionally trained.  
Furthermore, according to most news accounts, the shooters were sanctioned by the 
central government.7 
There are several other aspects of the government which run counter to the duties 
of the state toward its people.  The patronage system in Yemen contributes to many of 
these problems.  By providing support to only a select portion of its population, the 
 
                                                 
5Ghani et al., “Closing the Sovereignty Gap,” 6. 
6Boucek,Christopher and Ottaway, Marina eds.  “Yemen on the Brink,”Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, March 2010, 46. 
7 Adrian Blomfield, “Yemen Protests:  Evidence Snipers Shot to Kill,”  The Telegraph, August 12, 
2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/yemen/8392796/Yemen-protests-Evidence-
snipers-shot-to-kill.html, (accessed August 12, 2011). 
 5 
government is simultaneously providing ineffective administrative control of the country, 
mismanaging public finances, and investing unevenly in the human capital and 
infrastructure services in the country.   
It would be naïve to believe that all nations have the ability to provide for each of 
the areas Ghani et al. describe.  For example, the use of administrative control within the 
borders of a country with a strong history of tribes and clans would be met with equally 
strong resentment by the population.  However, President Saleh provided support for only 
certain tribes within the country, thus further fracturing a society which, according to a 
USAID report, was already heterogeneous along “geographic, tribal, religious and 
economic lines.”8 
C. THE PERILS OF CURRENT COIN DOCTRINE 
There is discussion in the literature about how to improve governance within a 
weak state, including prospects for other states’ assistance.  However, the literature only 
offers generalities regarding how other states can conduct COIN operations on behalf of a 
weak or illegitimate state.  This issue is particularly troubling because, in the absence of 
legitimacy, the population within undergoverned or ungoverned territory is unlikely to 
cooperate with either the state or outside intervening forces, no matter how altruistic their 
intentions may be.  In many cases, these areas have been repeatedly neglected or abused.  
The disproportionate use of patronage among the tribes, unfavorable land appropriation, 
unfunded civil projects, and unjust incarceration of tribal sheikhs has all contributed to 
tribal resentment of the Saleh regime. 
One of the effects of these injustices is the large swaths of undergoverned 
territories within Yemen.  The vacuum created by the lack of attention by the central 
government has enabled AQAP to find safe havens, training grounds, and willing recruits 
to bolster their ranks.  Part of the flow of extremists to undergoverned areas was 
prompted by the increase of counterterrorism efforts in Saudi Arabia.  According to 
Christopher Boucek, al-Qaeda operatives were encouraged by their local Saudi 
                                                 
8 United States Agency for International Development, “Yemen Corruption Assessment,” ARD, 
Burlington, Vermont, September 25, 2006. 
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commanders to relocate to Yemen in order to find respite from attacks by the Saudi 
forces.9 More importantly, however, the opportunity for such relocations was made 
available by the simple existence of areas where the government exerts no control, or is 
viewed negatively by the local population. 
D. AQAP AND U.S. INTERESTS 
The existence of AQAP, with a proclamation of wider goals since its inception, is 
a drain on both Saudi and Yemeni resources, but contributes to regional instability as 
well.  More germane to U.S. interests, however, is the proven ability of AQAP to commit 
acts of violence against the interests of the United States.  This has been seen in the attack 
on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000 to the attempted Christmas Day attack on the Northwest 
Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit in 2009 as well as the plot to put bombs in 
packages bound for the U.S. via UPS and FedEx.  To counter the waxing power of 
AQAP, the United States has recently increased its focus on Yemen as a partner in the 
war against transnational terrorism.  The U.S. provides direct economic and advisory 
support in order to bolster the Yemeni government as well as supporting the districts far 
removed from, and little supported by, the central government.  In addition to economic 
support, the U.S. has been aiding Yemen’s fight against AQAP by giving military aid and 
assistance to Yemen over the past several years.    Despite recent successes, the evidence 
of AQAP deterioration is suspect. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The United States, thus, finds itself in a quandary in how to deal with the situation 
in Yemen.  The problems which beset Yemen are systemic and enduring, and many feel 
that the Saleh regime did as much to prolong the fight with AQAP as it did to win it.  In 
order to counter the threat from AQAP, the United States must therefore craft its policies 
and military strategy with a realization of the importance of state and tribal dynamics, 
                                                 
9Christopher Boucek, “Yemen:  Avoiding a Downward Spiral,” from Yemen on the Brink, Boucek, 
Christopher and Ottaway, Marina, eds., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, 14. 
 7 
resource scarcity, ineffective governance, and how these problems allow for AQAP to be 
seen as an attractive alternative to the status quo. 
1. Chapter II:  Yemen as a Failing State 
In order to do so Chapter II will identify how Yemen fits the description of a 
failing state.  Essential to this argument is a discussion of the history of Yemen, with an 
emphasis on the rise, rule, and demise President Saleh.  Just as important, however, is a 
thorough understanding of the sociopolitical dynamics within Yemen, especially with 
regard to the tribal confederations.  Through this lens, we will show that the pervasive 
use of patronage and associated corruption within Yemen, when combined with the 
dwindling resources and shrinking economy of Yemen have dramatically weakened the 
ability of the government to deal with the host of problems with which it is beset.  The 
result is not only increased dissension in the general population, but the creation of a 
power vacuum, especially in ungoverned areas, which AQAP seeks to exploit through 
violent and non-violent means.  This chapter will also show that the current U.S. 
involvement and strategy toward Yemen, while growing in scope, has proved to be 
largely ineffective, and will continue to decrease in effectiveness if not changed.     
2. Chapter III:  Analysis of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
While Chapter II discussed the Yemeni landscape and how it is particularly 
susceptible to the growth of insurgents, Chapter III will delve into AQAP itself.  Included 
in this discussion is its formation from the Saudi and Yemeni AQ affiliates into a single 
entity.  This chapter will also explore how AQAP has used a grievance-based narrative to 
find a sympathetic audience in some of the tribal regions in Yemen.  Finally, this chapter 
will describe potential weaknesses within the AQAP narrative and associated operations 
which can be exploited. 
3. Chapter IV:  Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice 
To that end, this thesis will explore how best to conduct COIN operations in 
partnership with or on behalf of the weak Yemeni government, to fight the influence of 
AQAP, an international terrorist organization seeking to export violence to western 
 8 
nations.  In order to provide a systematic, defensible approach, the study will first explain 
what COIN is and how it is relevant to fighting insurgencies in places like Yemen.  We 
will identify why we believe COIN is a better option to other methods available to 
strategists and how its proper implementation has the ability to disrupt or contain the 
violence that AQAP has the potential to spread. 
4. Chapter V:  Case Study Analysis 
Chapter V will use case study analysis in order to extract best practices for 
possible inclusion in a revised U.S. strategy toward Yemen.  In order to choose the most 
relevant historical cases, it was necessary to find examples of countries with illegitimate 
central governments which also had insurgencies within their borders.  To that end, we 
have selected the British Malaya, the Somoza Regime in Nicaragua, and the Barre 
Regime in Somalia, for inclusion in this analysis.  Each case study will describe the 
sociopolitical landscape within the country and a description of the insurgency with 
which it was faced.  It will then systematically explore the methods used to counter the 
insurgent forces and whether or not they were successful.   
5. Chapter VI:  Policy Recommendations and Conclusion 
Chapter VI will focus on COIN application towards three separate courses of 
action and policy recommendations.  The best practices culled from case study analysis 
will be further investigated to see if they can be used in Yemen.  If applicable, they will 
be included as recommended changes in U.S. policy toward Yemen.  These 
recommendations will include both short-term and long-range goals that, when used as 
part of a systematic plan, will provide the surest way to secure U.S. interests in Yemen. 
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II. YEMEN 
A. YEMEN:  HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 Yemen is a weak state for numerous reasons, including its relative newness, tribal 
heterogeneity, geographic divisions, and its dwindling natural resources.  Moreover, 
imperial influences in Yemen from the Ottoman Empire in the north and the British in the 
south solidified the divided structure of the country, which have been widened by 
counterproductive governmental policies over the last several decades.  The cleavages 
and tensions have manifested themselves with growing alacrity in recent years, and have 
made it easier for AQAP to become deeply entrenched in Yemen.  Without a clear 
understanding of these problems, it will be difficult to prescribe effective policy 
recommendations to further U.S. interests in the region.    
1. Yemen and Imperial Hubris – The Delineation of Geographical and 
Tribal Fractures 
Yemen has been subjected to foreign occupation many times in the past, most 
notably by the Ottoman Empire and the British.  The Ottomans learned quickly that the 
tribal loyalties were fleeting.  This was especially true of the northern highland Zaydi 
tribes, who objected even when outside rule was imposed by fellow Muslims, marching 
with the platform of uniting the umma.10  While the Ottomans held sway over Yemen for 
years (until the empire’s collapse in 1918), it was the British experience which had the 
larger historical impact.  Initially, Britain was only looking for a deep water port to refuel 
its ships transiting from Suez to Bombay.  To that end, Britain conquered and held the 
southern port of Aden from 1839,11 and continued to use the port after the completion of 
the Suez Canal in 1869.     
 Misunderstanding the nature of the tribal system and the style and form of the 
leadership of the sheikhs and imams within Yemen hampered British rule of Aden from 
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its beginning in 1839 to their departure in 1967.  The British thought that the leaders 
within Yemen would follow the same system of rule followed in the western world.  
According to Clark, the Arab world holds very different ideas on the rule of governance.  
This is especially true among the tribes in Yemen, who believe that the idea of ‘rule’ is 
centered on wisdom, arbitration, and justice.  Further, the idea of absolute power in 
governance was also a foreign idea.  Clark goes on to point out that in Yemen, the 
sheikhs were not absolute rulers and only continued to hold their position to the extent 
that they could provide for their tribes.  The British did not recognize this stark reality 
within Yemen, and treated the sultans like absolute monarchs, reinforcing their power by 
doling out concessions based on how acquiescent they were to British dictums, rather 
than how good they were in the administration of justice, which was their traditional 
source of power.12  In this way, tribes learned to make promises of obedience but to act 
in their best interest whenever it suited them.  For example, one Sultan bought the loyalty 
of several other tribes and tried to retake the port from the British by force.  This line of 
thinking was anachronistic to the British, but was actually quite normal for the tribes, 
whose loyalty was never absolute. 
 Despite these misunderstandings, the British (often through force) kept their 
stronghold in Aden until 1967.  The British never held ambitions for expansion of their 
control past the port of Yemen and its immediate surrounding areas.  To that end, they 
agreed with the Ottoman Empire to divide Yemen into Northern and Southern 
geographical areas.  These geographic lines were set down in the Joint Anglo-Turkish 
Boundary Commission of 1902–1905, with the addition of the “Violet Line” in 1914.13  
The British used this geographic line as a buffer against incursions by the northern Zaydi 
tribes.  However, Imam Yahya (who was Imam of Zaydi tribes) continually pushed these 
boundaries, as he claimed that the Zaydis were the rightful rulers of all Yemen.14  While 
 
                                                 
12Clark, Yemen:  Dancing on the Heads of Snakes, 34. 
13 John M. Willis, “Leaving Only Question-Marks:  Geographies of Rule in Modern Yemen,” in 
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Madawi Al-Rasheed and Robert Vitalis (Gorndonsville, VA:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 128. 
14 Victoria Clark, Yemen:  Dancing on the Heads of Snakes, 43. 
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it made sense at the time, the separation of Yemen into Northern and Southern 
geographical lines calcified a sociopolitical division in the country which reverberates 
even today.   
 
 Northern Yemen was given de facto independence from the Ottoman Empire in 
1918 due to its loss in WWI.  Subsequent to the Ottoman departure from Yemen, Yahya 
steadfastly kept the north isolated from the rest of the world.  He limited travel into the 
country, but also forbade travel outside Yemen until 1947.15  After Yahya’s death, his 
son Ahmed broke with the isolationist tradition of his father, and signed onto the United 
Arab States confederation (a part of the United Arab Republic—headed by Egypt and 
Syria).  The Yemeni military began sending their officers to Egyptian schools and other 
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Figure 1.   North and South Yemen (From Carnegie Endowment). 
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training venues, which held great impact on them.16  In the civil war that followed shortly 
after, the republican forces were supported by 70,000 Egyptian military forces that were 
sent to Yemen.  In this civil war, the tribesmen were able to hold off the forces and come 
out on top.17  The government which came after was a mixture of modernity and 
traditional tribal norms.  It was able to wield enough power to counter the government in 
southern Yemen after the British left in 1967.   
Yet even before they left, the British never fully understood the various tribes, 
affiliations, and the turbulent struggles which ensued as a result.  This was compounded 
by the creation of both the Marxist National Liberation Front (NLF) and the Front for the 
Liberation of Southern Yemen (FLOSY), both of which were dedicated to the removal of 
occupation powers.  The NLF was supported by Egypt’s President Nasser, whose ideas of 
pan-Arabism were gaining ground throughout the region.18  FLOSY was the main 
competitor of the NLF.  While Nasser tried to unify both groups, they went to war with 
each other instead, which set south Yemen toward a Marxist future.19 
As discussed above, the British did not devote resources to the immediate area 
outside the port of Aden.  These disenfranchised tribes sought to wrest control of 
southern Yemen from the British, which became easier with the waning power of the 
British in the area.  The British recognized that they couldn’t stay in Aden indefinitely, 
and issued a defense white paper in 1966, which signaled the end of their presence in 
Yemen.  All agreements between the British and the sultans, sheikhs, and tribes in the 
region they had co-opted with monetary disbursements were considered to be invalid 
after 1968.  The lines of demarcation between North and South Yemen were thus 
complete, and the two sides continued to go down very different paths. 
                                                 
16 Mohammed A. Zabarah, The Yemeni Revolution of 1962 seen as a Social Revolution  in 
Contemporary Yemen: “Politics and Historical Background,” ed. P.R. Prinham (New York:  St. Martin’s 
Press, 1984), 78. 
17 David M. Witty, “Egypt in North Yemen, 1962–1967,” The Journal of Military History 65, no. 2 
(April 2001): 401–439. 
18 Joseph Kostiner, The Struggle for South Yemen (New York:  St. Martin’s, 1984), 120. 
19 Robert W. Stookey, South Yemen:  A Marxist Republic in Arabia (Boulder, CO:  Westview Press, 
1982), 63. 
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Free from British rule, the Marxist NLF moved for Yemeni unity through a 
platform of Arab solidarity.  However, while they felt that all Yemeni people were part of 
a single unit, they emphasized unity chiefly among the local tribes in South Yemen.20  
Furthermore, the NLF sought to eliminate ”tribal spirit” (al-Ruh al-Qibliyyah), as well as 
the schisms they felt were brought about by the British.  On the other hand, the former 
Imamate in the North continued to support the tribes.  Now a republic, it supported both 
the Hashid and Bakil tribal confederations, and included them in their leadership 
structure.  The divergent paths of the north and south made it impractical for unification 
between the two sides until the profits from the sale of oil began in the 1980s.  By this 
time, the north had become the dominant player in Yemen, and was led by its president 
—Ali Abdullah Saleh, who came to power there in 1978. 
2. Saleh and the Road to Disunity 
The period between Saleh’s rise to power in the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) 
and the unification between it and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) 
in the south in 1990 was fraught with both internal struggle and external tensions, much 
of which centered on its relations with Saudi Arabia.21   Faced with the pressure of 
office, Saleh looked outside his regime for help.  While Saudi Arabia had provided 
assistance in the past22, it angered Saleh by claiming areas within Yemen, including the 
Hadrahmaut region, part of the Shabwa region, and by distributing passports to 
Hadhramis.23  Thus, instead of courting additional support from Saudi Arabia, Saleh 
alienated his country further through his support for Saddam Hussein and Iraq, during the 
first Gulf War in 1991.  To that end, the YAR founded the Arab Cooperation Council 
along with Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq.  This pleased Iraq, as Saddam Hussein wished for a 
stronger Yemen to counter the powerful influence of Saudi Arabia in the region.   
                                                 
20 Joseph Kostiner, The Struggle for South Yemen (New York: St. Martin’s, 1984), 84. 
21 Robert D. Burrowes, The Yemen Arab Republic: “The Politics of Development 1962–1986,” 
(Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1987), 94–97, 118. 
22 Yemenis working in the Saudi Arabian oil fields sent millions of dollars in remittances back to 
Yemen. 
23 Clark, Yemen: “Dancing on the Heads of Snakes,” 133. 
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The merger of north and south Yemen in 1990 brought together two very different 
regions under one banner.  It was therefore inevitable that tensions flared in the newly 
united country.  In 1990, especially due to the demise of the Soviet Union and the 
subsequent disappearance of the support it gave to the PDRY, the YAR was in a strong 
position to lead the country.  Unfortunately for Yemen, and fortunately for President 
Saleh, the country was in need of support from any source that was equipped to support it 
through revenue-bearing projects.24  President Saleh pinned his hopes on the oil fields in 
Yemen, with the desire that they would enable Yemen to pull itself out of its 
impoverished state.   
3. How to Lose Friends and Alienate People – Divide and Conquer? 
The constitution by which Yemen began to govern itself gave a large amount of 
power to the executive branch.  Based on a 1972 draft, the constitution was based on 
international norms, rather than on the political realities within Yemen.25   The document 
was further modified in 1994 and 2001, scaling back some of the more liberal promises 
made, giving even more power to the central government.  While the constitution gave 
considerable power to the executive, the new Yemen did little to ease the apprehensions 
of the people it purported to rule.  For example, Saleh used his army to—in a heavy-
handed way—protect the oil installations which provided the income his country 
desperately needed.  In doing so, he exacerbated tribal feelings of alienation.     
While it seemed the best course of action, the increased bonds of friendship 
between Yemen and Iraq couldn’t have come at a worse time for Yemen.  Merely two 
months after the merger between north and south Yemen, Iraq invaded Kuwait.  When 
asked by the United States to support its efforts against Iraq, Yemen chose to side with 
Iraq, thus solidifying the rift between it and Saudi Arabia.  Saudi Arabia quickly revoked 
the preferential terms it had given to Yemeni workers within the kingdom by telling all 
800,000 expatriates they had one month to leave the country.26  Not only did this put a 
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strain on the already weak job market within Yemen, the remittances that had been 
coming from Saudi Arabia to Yemen from these workers ceased as well.  Yemen’s 
support of Iraq also meant the cessation of financial assistance from the United States.  
Despite clear warnings from Secretary of State Baker, Yemen did not take the matter 
seriously and thus lost the $70 million per year the United States had been giving to the 
country.  While it cost Yemen millions of dollars to do so, siding with Iraq played well to 
the domestic audience because of the seeming quickness with which Saudi Arabia let the 
infidel into its country.  In this way, Saleh yet again weakened his country for the short-
term gain of solidarity with Iraq without thinking of the longer-term consequences of 
alienating his allies in the region. 
The speed with which Yemen lost a large portion of its income must have alarmed 
Saleh more than he was willing to admit.  Even at this early stage in a united Yemen’s 
history, Saleh and the highland Zaydis had consolidated control over the finance and 
defense sectors of the country, and there was little that anybody could do about the 
already-present patronage system which was growing larger with each passing month.  
One of the methods for the north to receive their patronage was through the funneling of 
oil revenue (from southern oil fields) directly to the coffers in the north – and there was 
little that could be done about it.  For example, when the southern defense minister 
learned how much money was being funneled to the northern tribes, his efforts at putting 
an end to the patronage being doled out “brought him into direct confrontation with 
members of the president’s own clan who occupied many of the most senior posts in the 
former YAR’s army.”27  Thus, even at this early stage the patronage system was quite 
entrenched within governmental practices.   
Even though they had been nominally unified in 1990, the tensions between the 
south and the north were still present and came to a head soon afterward.  The 
parliamentary elections in 1993 were part of the tension, as the leaders of the Yemen 
Socialist Party (YSP) felt compelled to leave Sana’a in the weeks directly prior to the 
elections in order to voice their displeasure with the regime.  Al-Bidhi, the leader of the 
YSP, left Sana’a again in August of 1993, this time detailing the grievances shared by 
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those in the south, and further demanding that the issues be resolved before his return to 
Sana’a.  Although there were strong efforts at mediation (led by Egypt, Oman, and the 
UAE), there were no agreements for over a year.  In fact, on the first anniversary of the 
1993 parliamentary elections, elements of the militaries from both the north and the south 
began fighting, thus starting the civil war of 1994.  The south formally seceded from the 
north in May of 1994.  The north, under the leadership of Saleh, regained the south in 
July of 1994. 
While Saudi Arabia supported southern secession through the provision of Saudi 
weapons, the south was doomed to fail for two key reasons.  First, the United States was 
pro-unification, which ensured that the actors in the region would not go overboard in 
their support for the YSP in Aden.  More importantly, president Saleh was quite adroit at 
playing to the fears of the Yemeni people.  Saleh portrayed the separatists as malevolent 
actors bent on destroying the high ideal of a unified Yemen.  President Saleh also used 
the words of religion in his favor, deeming the southerners who wanted to secede as 
‘godless Marxists.’28  Saleh also had the backing of the northern religious leaders who 
supported the war by calling it a jihad in the name of God, and further claimed that the 
northerners were going to heaven while the southerners were going to hell.  In these key 
ways, the rift between the north and south was not only present before 1990, but 
solidified by the policies of the Saleh government subsequent to the unification.  
One of the biggest divisions between the north and the south is seen in the 
pervasive patronage system in Yemen.  The wealth within Yemen began to shift from the 
periphery to the core with shocking speed.  The loss of remittances from foreign workers 
coupled with the new income from oil meant that the money was coming directly to the 
central government, and not to the poorest of the population who sent their sons away to 
find a better life.  The shift of power and wealth affected the ability of the central state to 
influence all facets of life grew as well.  The government found that it was able to dole 
out money and favors in order to earn the loyalty of the tribal sheikhs.  The importance of 
this shift in loyalty cannot be overstated.  Indeed, the legitimacy of the sheikhs no longer 
rest on their ability to provide for the welfare of their tribe, but on their willingness to 
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show loyalty to the government.  The shift of the sheikh’s loyalty meant that the bond 
between the sheikhs and the tribal members weakened, lessening the solidarity and thus 
the power of the tribe.  Therefore, when the government finds itself unable to suppress a 
rebellion, it can simply ask the tribe to do it instead—or face the end of funds and favors 
being handed to the tribe. 
Patronage within Yemen is truly systemic.  Some tribes benefit from patronage 
while others do not, and the government must be careful with how resources are doled 
out or face the prospect of civil strife yet again.  In fact, it seems the only prerequisite to 
the receipt of patronage is to be seen as influential by the government.  This could mean 
that the receiver is influential within their own limited circle, but it could also be that they 
are part of a balance of power scheme by the government.    
In order to maintain a balance of power, Saleh was more inclusive in patronage 
than otherwise would be expected.  The inner circle of the Yemeni government is 
comprised of Saleh’s family members, who also control key posts within the military.  
The top posts within the military are also given to Saleh’s tribe – the Sanhan.  
Furthermore, the patronage system within Yemen is not comprised of only money, but 
the provision of civil service and military jobs as well.  In this way, the government uses 
patronage to “co-opt, divide, reward and punish”29 Yemeni elites through the patronage 
system, to the detriment of governmental institutions.   
Moving the path to affluence from merit to loyalty has weakened the Yemeni 
economy in other ways.  At 35 percent, the tax base in Yemen is the highest in the region.  
Importantly, however, (in 2010) only 7.3 percent of Yemen’s GDP came from taxes.  
Some companies and individuals can negotiate lower tax rates, while others use two sets 
of books—one which reflects reality, and the other which they use for tax reporting 
purposes.30  The practice of using two sets of accounting books is not only necessary for 
a company’s survival, but it makes them complicit in criminal activities.  This type of 
corruption is not limited to private sector corporations, as both the military and other 
government ministries (such as the Ministry of Education) use fake employment rosters 
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to increase their funding.31  It is therefore not surprising that this practice is rampant, as 
nobody in Yemen expects revenues from collected taxes to be put to good use.   
B. YEMEN’S RESOURCE PROBLEMS – OIL, WATER, AND 
DEMOGRAPHICS 
The use of patronage by the government weakens some tribes, and strengthens 
others.  In the volatile times that Yemen is facing, the only way for it to lessen civil 
unrest is to either suppress it through force, or to widen its base of support (or solidify its 
current support) through additional disbursement of favors and money.  Both of these 
tactics have been used widely in the past, but are impossible to sustain.  The dwindling of 
resources within Yemen is one of the most serious problems facing the country today.  
Oil is the lynchpin of the Yemeni economy.  It has provided the government with an 
income that the country had never before enjoyed.  In fact, oil had accounted for over 75 
percent of government revenue.32  However, oil revenues dropped by about 40 percent in 
2009, caused not only by a depletion of resources but by a drop in the price of oil on the 
world market from its high point in 2008.  To make matters worse, Saleh announced in 
2010 that Yemen became a net importer of oil.  The government claimed that the export 
of natural gas would make up for these losses, but the figures claimed by the regime were 
four times what were actually received.33  Part of the problem is how the production 
licenses are set up.  There are three separate agreements for the extraction of natural 
resources – one for oil, one for natural gas, and a separate one for a combination of both.  
The companies that have a contract for oil therefore do not spend their resources 
developing natural gas, because the contracts under which they operate does not pay them 
to do so.34  Despite these problems, many of which are not beyond the control of the 
government, nothing is being done to prepare Yemen for a future without oil. 
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The same is true for water.  Yemen is the region’s driest country, and one of the 
most water-scarce countries in the world.  According to Boucek, the water problems are 
due to rising domestic consumption, poor water management, absence of resource 
governing structures, and wasteful irrigation techniques.  In short, water is being 
extracted faster than the water aquifers are being filled.35  The lack of oversight means 
that anybody who wants water, and has the necessary capital to do so, can dig and extract 
a much as they want.  The importation of water drilling rigs is not subject to customs 
duties, licensing, or taxation.  As a result, the ministry of water and environment has 
proclaimed that 99 percent of all water extraction is unlicensed.  Not only has the central 
government done nothing to solve the problem, they have transferred authority to the 
peripheral governorates responsible for their own water procurement36, thus hiding the 
fact that much of the territory within Yemen lies outside their control.   
One of the biggest contributors to the water problem is the extensive growth of 
qat, a water-intensive narcotic plant that is widely popular in Yemen.  In fact, qat can be 
grown year-round, and be cultivated within just weeks of being planted.  Thus, a farmer 
can earn much more than they could otherwise receive, especially as there is no 
regulation in its production.  Qat production takes up so much of the arable land within 
Yemen that the country has become a net food importer.  This is quite troubling because 
the UN World Food Program noted that the country’s childhood malnutrition rates are 
one of the highest in the world, with 97 percent of Yemeni households not bringing in 
enough money to buy food.37 
The lack of food in Yemen is becoming more acute due to the high birth rate in 
the country.  At 3.4 percent, it is one of the highest in the world, especially considering 
the dire economic straits of the country.  Over two-thirds of the population is under 24 
years of age, and the population is expected to double in the next twenty years to 40 
million.  Worse, less than one-third of the population lives in an urban environment.  The 
dispersed nature of the population makes the provision of basic resources, including food, 
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water, and education, much more difficult to achieve, necessitating self-sufficiency in the 
tribes.  Further compounding the problem is the introduction of a large number of new 
job seekers into a shrinking job market—unemployment is currently listed at a 
conservative 35 percent, and continues to grow.38 
 The confluence of problems in Yemen is partly due to the lack of natural 
resources and the sociopolitical dynamics of the country.  However, the problems have 
been greatly exacerbated by the way President Saleh used patronage to run the country.  
It fostered a mindset of corruption and made clear that poor governance practices are not 
mutually exclusive of receiving government payouts.  In other words, the resources of the 
country are being spent foolishly, and the population – especially in the rural areas – is 
paying the price.  Saleh refused to recognize the unsustainable nature of his policies, and 
put Yemen’s future at great risk.  The manifestation of these problems is seen in several 
ongoing movements in the country, including the Southern Movement, the Houthi 
Rebellion, the Arab Spring, and the growth of AQAP. 
1. Manifestation of Tensions – The Southern Secessionist Movement 
The division between north and south Yemen has been solidified by the different 
paths the regions have taken since the occupation by the Ottomans in the north and the 
British in the south.  The Southern secessionist movement began in 2007 as a reaction to 
the mishandling of the unification between north and south Yemen.  Those involved in 
the movement give voice to the widespread belief that the Saleh regime (as well as his 
family and the Hashid tribe) has exploited the south in order to expand his power.  This 
includes the movement of oil revenues from Yemen’s largest oil field at al-Maseela in the 
Hadrahmaut province in the south back to the central government.  To that end, the 
southerners have moved from calling for equality among the tribes to a movement whose 
goal is secession from Yemen itself, and the creation of a ‘South Yemen.’39  While the 
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movement—at the moment—has little chance of succeeding, if Yemen continues to 
weaken as a state, the group’s agenda could gain traction. 
2. Manifestation of Tensions – The Houthi Rebellion 
The Houthis are a group of Shi’i Zaidi conservatives who have been in conflict 
with the central Yemeni government since 2004.  The fighting initially began with a 
protest against the dilution of their religion within Yemen, as well as displeasure about 
Yemen’s cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the United States.  However, the group’s 
grievances have expanded to include a general displeasure with the government – without 
voicing specific grievances.40  The fighting has been taking place in the Saada 
governorate on the border with Saudi Arabia.     
There have been several rounds of fighting in the conflict.  The fighting became 
more intense, and hit a high point with the government’s ‘Scorched Earth’ campaign in 
2010.  They deployed over 40,000 troops to the area.  The government also deployed the 
Popular Army, a group of tribal levies and other informal fighters corralled by the 
government.41  Furthermore, Saudi Arabia also sent some of its military forces to help 
Yemen with the fighting.  By most accounts, the casualties in this conflict have been 
relatively low, ranging from several hundred to several thousand.  However, the rebellion 
has cost the government much in the way of financial resources and political and military 
legitimacy. 
3. Manifestation of Tensions – The Arab Spring in Yemen 
The Arab Spring that began in 2011 has spread from Tunisia and Egypt to 
Bahrain, Libya, Syria, and Yemen.  The protests in Yemen began quietly at first, calling 
attention to poverty and corruption within the country.  However, these protests quickly 
gained momentum, and calls for the resignation of President Saleh were soon heard.  
Despite the government’s initial efforts to placate the protesters, Saleh soon began to lose 
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support of the tribes, the religious elite, and powerful elements within the military.  The 
government crackdown included killing protesters in Taghyir Square in Sana’a with 
government-loyal snipers.   
The protests reached a crucial point on 3 June, 2011, when President Saleh was 
severely injured in a rocket attack which also seriously wounded the prime minister, two 
of his deputies, the speaker of parliament, and the head of the Consultative Council.  He 
received care for his wounds in Saudi Arabia for several months before returning to 
Yemen on 22 September 2011.  The situation in Yemen did not improve with his return, 
which led the United Nations Security Council to pass Resolution 201442, which called 
for an end to the violence and for President Saleh to resign.  Saleh finally agreed, and on 
23 November 2011 signed a deal brokered by the GCC—a deal similar to the three which 
he promised (and then refused) to sign.  The controversial agreement provides amnesty 
for Saleh and his family members, who still control much of the military and intelligence 
services.  Saleh will temporarily retain the honorary title of President, but has handed 
over all constitutional duties to the Vice President, which will be retained until February 
2012, when Presidential elections will be held.  Despite the fact that the agreement calls 
for a new, more inclusive government, many of the protesters continue to demand for the 
trial of Saleh.  Vice President Abed Rabo Mansour Hadi has been charged with forming 
an interim government, and appointed the leader of the opposition (Mohammed 
Basindwa) as interim Prime Minister.43 
Despite these promising developments, Yemen’s future is still bleak.  Both Sana’a 
and Taiz are highly militarized, which will be unlikely to change in the near future.  Also, 
restructuring the military – which is part of the agreement—will be difficult because 
many units remain under the control of Saleh’s family and close allies.44  While the 
elections in February seem promising, it remains to be seen if the opposition groups can 
nominate a candidate who will address the many problems Yemen faces. This is 
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especially true as many of the protesters feel that President Saleh should not be given 
amnesty.  If they end up boycotting the elections, the legitimacy of the new regime will 
be greatly diminished.  Furthermore, any new government will find it hard to end the 
corruption and patronage practices which have been part and parcel of Yemeni politics 
for decades.  Finally, even if they are successful in ending those practices, the issues of 
resource scarcity, rapid population growth, and high unemployment will only grow worse 
over time.  As a result of these problems, the new Yemeni government will likely try to 
find a middle ground in the Yemeni societal minefield, and end up satisfying nobody. 
4. The Growth of AQAP 
The dire straits Yemen finds itself in have been mostly of its own making.  
Through multiple sustained practices, the government has lost the tenuous support of the 
people, and is quickly losing its ability to continue its payouts to those on whom it has 
traditionally relied.  Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is using these cleavages to great 
effect.  AQAP has discovered that Yemen is the perfect environment to recruit new 
members, train its operatives, and to plan and conduct operations.  While AQAP will be 
discussed in detail in the next chapter, it is important to mention here that the group finds 
a willing audience in many of Yemen’s poorest rural areas precisely because of the 
problems described above. 
C. YEMEN AND U.S. INTERESTS 
The United States has definite interests regarding the current developments in 
Yemen.  The most pressing issue for the U.S. is the rapid growth in the power of AQAP 
in the country.  The U.S. has focused on AQAP as the most pressing threat from Yemen 
because of its ability to perpetrate violence against western interests.    This has been 
proven several times over – from the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000 to the attempted 
Christmas Day attack on the Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit in 
2009.  Because of this, the United States has recently increased its focus on Yemen as a 
partner in the war against transnational terrorism.   
 24 
While the United States has had success in attacking AQAP leadership, the Saleh 
regime was a vacillating partner.  One reason for this is the large areas within Yemen that 
were continuously neglected by the Saleh regime.  The vacuum created by the lack of 
attention by the central government has enabled AQAP to find safe havens, training 
grounds, and (at times) willing recruits to bolster their ranks.  Additionally, part of the 
flow of extremists to undergoverned areas was prompted by the increase of 
counterterrorism efforts in Saudi Arabia.  According to Christopher Boucek, al-Qaeda 
operatives were encouraged by local Saudi commanders to relocate to Yemen in order to 
find respite from attacks by the Saudi forces.45 More importantly, however, the 
opportunity for such relocations was made available by the simple existence of areas of 
space where the government exerts no control, or is viewed negatively by the local 
population.   
The United States has focused on Yemen as a partner in its efforts against Al 
Qaeda since September 11th, and against AQAP since its inception in 2009.  The United 
States has a two-pronged approach to Yemen.  First, the U.S. seeks to strengthen 
Yemen’s ability to promote security within its borders.  The second prong is to assist 
Yemen with respect to their economic crisis and address limitations in “government 
capacity, provision of services, and transparency.”46 
In order to increase Yemen’s capacity to provide security within its own borders, 
the United States is providing military aid and training.  In FY2009, the Department of 
Defense allocated $66.8 million in 1206 funds47  for equipment and training of the 
Yemeni military, an increase from $4.3 million in FY2006.48  In fact, Yemen is the 
largest recipient of Section 1206 funds, with over 20 percent going to support equipping 
and training its military, as well as providing small airplanes and helicopters for use by 
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Yemen’s Special Operations Forces.49  The United States has also been training Yemen’s 
Counterterrorism Unit of the Central Security Organization since 2002.  In addition to 
military aid, the United States provides direct financial assistance (separate from 1206 
funds) to the Saleh regime.  The amount has steadily increased over recent years, with a 
current level of $52.5 million (appropriated in P.L. 111–117).50 
The United States has had decidedly mixed results in its efforts in Yemen.  The 
kinetic operations have resulted in the deaths of some of AQAP’s top operatives, but the 
Saleh regime has not been the ardent supporter the U.S. has hoped it would be.  The 
cleavages brought about by imperial rule and the policies of the Saleh regime greatly 
weakened the Yemeni state, to the point that Saleh found it impossible to stem the tide 
against the forces rallying against him.  This is certainly true of AQAP, which has been 
able to enmesh itself in Yemeni society.  In order to find the best way for the United 
States to counter AQAP, a thorough investigation of the organization is necessary, which 
will be covered in Chapter III. 
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III. AL-QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA (AQAP) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Al-Qaeda was a threat to regional stability the Arabian Peninsula and in Yemen, 
for at least ten years prior to the September 11 attacks.  They transformed themselves 
from a disjointed group with limited operational capabilities to a re-branded, powerful 
insurgent organization capable of conducting sophisticated attacks both within Yemen 
and abroad.  Their steady growth in power is seen especially in recent operations in 
Abyan province in Southern Yemen, and is coupled with a tailored narrative that is 
pleasing to much of the Yemeni population. 
B. GENESIS 
The genesis for al-Qaeda in Yemen consisted of Arab Afghan volunteers 
returning from their fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.  These fighters were 
accorded hero status by much of the Yemeni population, heralded by the Yemeni 
government, and given positions within the Yemeni military and security forces.51  The 
envelopment of these individuals back into everyday society meant that al-Qaeda did not 
have a base from which to recruit in Yemen in the early 1990s.  The precursor to al-
Qaeda in Yemen – the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army – was the cause of many of the attacks 
in Yemen prior to the formation of al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQY).52  The group, with 
support from al-Qaeda senior leadership, may have been involved in a plan to kill U.S. 
Marines transiting through Aden in support of Operation Restore Hope in December 
1992 as well as being responsible for kidnapping 16 tourists in 1998. 
 The first attack in Yemen directly attributable to al-Qaeda was the bombing of the 
USS Cole in 2000.  The attack was made by a small boat packed with explosives that 
pulled alongside the Cole while it was docked in the port in Aden.  The attack killed 17 
Americans and wounded 39 more.  Despite the lethality of the attack, al-Qaeda in Yemen 
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was still quite disorganized.  Especially from 2001–2003, al-Qaeda in Yemen was more a 
collection of individuals and small groups who were unprepared to carry out sustained 
operations against the Yemeni government.53  Thus, while they were able to plan and 
conduct operations, the attacks were limited in both size and scope. 
To that end, neither the United States nor Yemen paid particular attention to the 
group until the U.S. began the Global War on Terror (GWOT).  President Saleh knew 
siding against the U.S. would be to his detriment, which he first learned after siding with 
Iraq during its 1990 invasion of Kuwait.  The U.S. halted aid for years after this 
declaration, and the economic costs were quite severe.  Thus, after the September 11 
attacks, the Yemeni government began to round up anybody they thought fit the profile 
of a member of an al-Qaeda militant in order to shore up support from the United States.  
This includes many who had been in Afghanistan, but many who hadn’t been outside the 
country at all.  Thus, hundreds of individuals that were deemed – for little reason – to be 
a security threat were thrown in prison where they had direct contact with actual al-Qaeda 
jihadists.54  These imprisonments served to delegitimize the Yemeni government in the 
eyes of those who were imprisoned, as well as their family members.  Furthermore, in 
these Yemeni prisons, the seeds of militancy had fertile ground to grow, and many new 
hands willing to till the fields. 
 In the nascent stages of the Global War on Terrorism, the United States and 
Yemen severely crippled al-Qaeda in Yemen.  In 2002, the Yemeni government gave its 
permission for the United States to launch missiles against al-Qaeda members in Eastern 
Yemen.  Six terrorists were killed, including Qaid Salim Sinan al-Harithi, who was the 
leader of al-Qaeda in Yemen and one of the planners for the attack on the U.S.S. Cole.  
The new leader, Muhammad Hamdi al Ahdal, was arrested in Yemen a year later.55  Both 
the United States and Yemen thought that the problem with al-Qaeda in Yemen had been 
solved, and placed little priority on keeping tabs on the organization.  Therefore, while 
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the United States was preoccupied with both Iraq and Afghanistan, and Yemen began to 
focus on the Houthi conflict, al-Qaeda had breathing room to recuperate and strengthen. 
 In February 2006, AQY became much stronger with the escape of 23 of Yemen’s 
most wanted terrorists.  The prisoners escaped by tunneling from their two room cell to 
an adjacent mosque, where they said their morning prayers before walking out the front 
door.56  Most accounts contend that the prisoners had help from inside the Yemeni 
intelligence service, which is notorious for hiring former Arab-Afghan volunteers and 
other jihadists.57   Among the escaped prisoners were Jamal al-Badawi and Jabir al-
Banna – both of who were on America’s most wanted lists.  U.S. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation personnel determined that Al-Badawi was one of the planners for the Cole 
attack.  Unfortunately, Yemen refused to extradite him, despite the fact that he escaped 
from jail in 2003 and 2006.  Although he turned himself in a year later, he was released 
from house arrest by the Yemeni authorities, who again refused to extradite him.58  He 
was subsequently pardoned after he renounced his jihadi ideology and pledged his 
support for President Saleh.  Furthermore, while Yemen claims that al-Badawi is helping 
them go after more jihadists, the government is complicit in its dealings with other 
identified U.S.S. Cole bombers.  Fahd al Quso, who admitted his part in the plot, was also 
released from a Yemeni prison in 2010, and was subsequently listed as a “Specially 
Designated Global Terrorist” under Executive Order 13224.59,60 
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C. THE MERGER AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
While most of this group has been killed or arrested, they are representative of the 
type of members the leaders of Al Qaeda has recruited into their ranks.  Furthermore, two 
of the escapees formed the nucleus for the current al-Qaeda structure in Yemen.  While a 
low-level operative at the time of the 2006 prison escape, Nasir al-Wahayshi is now the 
leader of AQAP, and Qasim al-Raymi is his deputy and military commander.  In a June 
2007 audio recording, al-Raymi declared that al-Wahayshi was the new amir of AQY.  
Just as important, the audiotape warned the older generation of militants in Yemen that 
their tacit non-aggression pact with the government was a treasonous alliance that 
wouldn’t be tolerated.61  The experience these two men hold makes the threat credible.  
Both al-Wahayshi and al-Raymi served under Osama Bin Laden, with al-Wahayshi 
acting as his understudy and personal secretary for four years (in the late 1990s) before 
returning to Yemen.  
After the release of the audio message, al-Wahayshi and al-Raymi focused on 
building the internal strength of the group.  The formation of the “The al-Qaeda 
Organization of Jihad in the Arabian Peninsula:  The Soldiers’ Brigades of Yemen” was a 
cell that was created to perform terrorist operations but was only loosely affiliated with 
al-Qaeda in Yemen.  However, the group was allied with al-Wahayshi, which allowed for 
its internal development while simultaneously conducting terrorist operations.  These 
operations coincided with a second message, this time aimed at the Yemeni government 
itself.  It demanded the government release al-Qaeda members from Yemeni prisons and 
promised revenge for the 2002 killing of Harithi.62,63 
The most damaging of these operations was the attack of a tourist convoy, which 
killed 8 Spaniards and their 2 Yemeni drivers.  There were also attacks on a Belgian 
tourist convoy as well as a military compound.  Acting on a tip, Yemeni forces attacked a 
safe house, killing several members, including the leader of the Soldiers’ Brigades of 
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Yemen, Hamza al-Qu’ayti. The killing of al-Qu’ayti was seen as a major setback for all 
militant groups in Yemen.  However, in September of the same year, the U.S. embassy in 
Sana’a was attacked, killing 19 people, including the 7 attackers.64  Furthermore, by the 
time of al-Qu’ayti’s death, al-Wahayshi had built a tenable core from which to expand 
the group and conduct autonomous operations. 
In January 2009, al-Qaeda in Yemen announced that the Saudi al-Qaeda branch 
had pledged allegiance to their leader (al-Wahayshi), forming a united al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).  At this time, AQAP was comprised of Saudi militants,65 
Saudi detainees who had escaped or had been released from Guantanamo Bay or Saudi 
rehabilitation programs, as well as Yemeni al-Qaeda members who had escaped from 
prisons in Yemen.66 
Nasir al-Wahayshi has organized AQAP into both territorial and job divisions.  
As such, they have a district leader for each of the major tribal areas.  They also have 
personnel assigned specifically for making bombs, operational planning, religious matters 
and information operations.  AQAP uses each of these branches quite effectively, which 
is largely responsible its recent growth in power.   
D. THE AQAP NARRATIVE 
According to Alistair Harris, AQAP offers a coherent grievance narrative that is 
consistent with the tenets of al-Qaeda, but specifically tailored to the local population.  
They contend that Muslims are suffering at the hands of a nefarious alliance between the 
Yemeni government and the United States.  To that end, they prescribe violent jihad 
against the west and apostate Muslim regimes and to expel all non-Muslims from the 
Arabian Peninsula.67  It is the propaganda arm of AQAP which tailors the message to fit 
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with the local tribes through various propaganda channels: including audio messages, 
videos, blogs, sermons, and magazines. 
One of the most important facets of the AQAP media blitz is Inspire Magazine, 
which is AQAP’s English-language jihadi magazine, published by Al-Malahem Media 
Foundation.68  This professional publication is finding a susceptible audience in many 
locales, including the United States.  According to Jarrett Brachman in testimony to the 
House Committee on Homeland Security, the message they are sending resonates 
because “AQAP now provides its online community with a compelling, comic book 
experience, one that equips individuals with the tools they need while demystifying the 
path they must take, to become their own al-Qaeda superhero.”69  Moreover, Anwar Al-
Awlaki, who was AQAP’s chief of media publications70, successfully proffered online 
video and audio lectures for over a decade.  He has packaged his publications in a 
populist tone, which has made him and the message he gives widely digestible to a wider 
audience in more geographic locations than ever before.  Inspire magazine is the 
embodiment of this tactic.  According to Brachman, Inspire magazine is so successful 
because it “lowers the proverbial wall that has deterred most online al-Qaeda supporters 
from actually going operational.”71  Nor is the audience just ‘playing jihadi’ by accessing 
these online forums.  By providing ready access to these slickly produced jihadi 
publications, the readers become further entrenched in the social context of radicalism. 
The susceptible audience for AQAP information operations is certainly not 
limited to those who live abroad.  As described above, the long-neglected and often 
abused tribes within Yemen find the media publications of AQAP quite attractive.  
Online publications are not very accessible to tribal members in Yemen, so AQAP has 
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used printed media in its place.  This includes media outputs from within Saudi Arabia 
(Mu’askar al-Battar or al-Battar Training Camp), as well as its more political publication 
Sawt al-Jihad (Voice of Jihad).  Another publication is the widely disseminated “Practical 
Course for Guerilla Warfare,” by former al-Qaeda leader in Saudi Arabia Abdel Aziz Issa 
Abdul-Mohsin al-Muqrin.72  AQAP has also focused on audio recordings, as well as 
interpersonal communications to foster the growth and dissemination of their message.   
This message has not fallen on deaf ears.  According to Alistair Harris, al-Qaeda’s 
publications give the Yemenis a clear-cut diagnosis of the problems, including a 
sympathetic synthesis of grievances and apportionment of blame for the problems 
Yemenis face in their everyday lives.  He goes on to point out that each of their 
publications and interactions provide “… a prognosis for the future, proposing remedies 
and redress.  In other words, AQAP provides both diagnostic and prognostic frameworks 
to mobilize followers and potential recruits into collective action.”73  The tribes have 
found the message so attractive that they have long sheltered AQAP operatives, including 
Nayef bin Mohammed bin Said al Kudri Qahtani.  He moved from Saudi Arabia in 2007 
(where he was on their ‘most wanted terrorist’ list), and was sheltered by the Waili tribe 
with other al-Qaeda operatives from both Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Qahtani founded 
Sada al Malahim (Echoes of Epics), which is AQAP’s Yemen magazine.  He 
subsequently built Malahim Media Foundation (Epics Foundation), which is AQAP’s 
propaganda outlet organization. 74  This also includes Muhammad Saleh al-’Awlaqi, who 
was harbored in the Shabwa tribal region.75  The willingness of the tribes to harbor al-
Qaeda operatives and turn a blind eye to them residing in ungoverned territories is one of 
the most vexing problems with regards to AQAP’s resurgence.   Johnsen points out that 
“…as Yemen grows weaker and as government power recedes further and further back 
into urban areas, this opens up a great deal of space in which al-Qaeda can 
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operate.”76Indeed, AQAP has used the undergoverned tribal areas, especially in Southern 
Yemen, as places where they can train and plan their attacks.   
E. AQAP OPERATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
 AQAP and its predecessor organizations have amassed a sizeable number of 
attacks.  Just as important as their number is the breadth of their scope.  Many of the 
attacks have used small arms to attack tourists and government officials.  Additionally, 
several of the attacks have targeted economic interests such as oil fields and pipelines as 
well as foreign business interests in Yemen.  In addition to attacks on Yemeni economic 
interests and the Yemeni government, AQAP has also conducted operations against Saudi 
Arabia.  The most notable of these is the attempted assassination of Saudi Deputy Interior 
Minister Mohammed bin Nayef.  Western interests abroad have also often been the 
target.  From the attempted attack on the USS The Sullivans in Aden harbor in January of 
2000 and the USS Cole attack later that year, to the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Sana’a, 
the United States is one of the main targets of Al Qaeda in the region.   
More ominous is the ability of AQAP to plan and conduct terrorist operations 
against American interests outside Yemen.  One of the most prominent examples of this 
expansion in operational tactics was the plot to send explosives-laden packages through 
the United Parcel Service and Federal Express companies to synagogues in Chicago, 
Illinois.  The second was the plot to destroy an airliner bound for Detroit, Michigan by 
exploding a device carried by the bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.  While both 
plots failed, there are two important facets of these operations to consider.  First, the 
explosive devices used in these attempts were quite sophisticated compared to other 
attacks attributed to AQAP.  Both explosive devices contained pentaerythritol tetranitrate 
(PETN) in sufficient quantities to cause the crash of the airplanes on which they were 
carried.  While Abdulmutallab carried the explosive device in his underpants, the 
explosives aboard the UPS and FedEx airplanes were contained in printer cartridges, and 
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were connected to timer mechanisms.77,78  The sophistication of these devices is 
testimony to the dedication of AQAP to perpetrate attacks against the United States while 
still attempting to maintain their ability to simultaneously plan and conduct attacks within 
Yemen. 
More recently, a cadre of AQAP members called Ansar al-Sharia (Supporters of 
Sharia) was created in order to further the AQAP cause in areas where the AQAP name 
may not be well-received.  The group took over two cities in Abyan province, including 
Jaar in March, and the southern coastal town of Zinzibar79 in May, after residents said 
security forces pulled out of the area.  The governor of Abyan province also fled to Aden, 
leaving an ill-equipped brigade to fight the group.80  Part of the reason AQAP has been 
so successful is that the Yemeni population in Abyan, having been neglected by the 
government, are quite sympathetic to the AQAP anti-government narrative.  The transfer 
of oil revenues from the southern provinces to back to the capital as part of Saleh’s 
patronage network is one such example.  More recently, the government suspended 800 
members of the armed forces without pay in the summer of 2010.  While the government 
has not given any reasons for the suspension, many speculate it is because of the long-
standing tensions between North and South Yemen, which has resulted in widespread 
animosity toward the government.81 
There is much discussion about the sheer volume of attacks that AQAP has 
committed against Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the United States.  However, there are 
aspects of the organization which must be recognized and exploited in order to secure 
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U.S. interests.  First, there are portions of the AQAP narrative which can be used against 
it.  The most popular grievances AQAP uses in its narrative are “civilian deaths resulting 
from counterterrorism raids; U.S. efforts to invade, disarm and subjugate Yemen’s tribes; 
the unwelcome presence of Yemeni security forces in tribal territory; and the pilfering of 
natural resources by the Saleh regime.”82  However, most of AQAP leadership is not 
from the areas which their messages target, nor does the group acknowledge that they are 
the reason for many of the counterterrorism raids or drone strikes.  Furthermore, AQAP 
attributes attacks designed to kill its members to the government directly attacking the 
tribes.   
One of the most striking examples of this was seen in the ‘Battle of Marib.’  A 
military convoy was attacked on 30 July, 2009 by a dozen tribesmen led by ‘A’yd al-
Shabwani, an alleged AQAP member.  After the initial firefight, the tribesmen returned to 
their homes, which were subsequently attacked by military forces.  Sana’a claimed that 
collateral damage was minimal, but AQAP produced a video that showed a different 
story than what the government said.  The media boon to AQAP was augmented by an 
airstrike targeting Al Shabwan in which many of the missiles hit two adjacent farms 
owned by local sheikhs, instead of their intended target.  To add insult to injury, a 
meeting arranged to negotiate the surrender of the AQAP emir in Marib was hit by a 
missile strike, killing the pro-government sheikh who had arranged the gathering.83  In 
order to counter the AQAP narrative, great care must be taken to practice discrimination 
in target selection and execution.  If not done properly, the media windfalls to AQAP will 
continue. 
Secondly, despite recent AQAP inroads into the southern provinces, the group is 
not yet powerful enough to provide an alternate means of governance in the area.  They 
have not established methods to resolve tribal disputes, nor have they provided 
significant (or sustained) financial support to tribes or their leadership.  Despite their 
successes in Abyan province, AQAP has not provided a viable alternative to the central 
government.  In this way, AQAP has not endeared themselves to the tribes in Yemen to 
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such an extent that tribal protection is a certainty.   However, the advent of this type of 
support to the tribes is a possibility that cannot be ignored, as it would give support to 
AQAP that it desperately needs.  
 
F. LIMITED SUCCESS POINTS TO THE NEED FOR A NEW POLICY 
TOWARD YEMEN 
The recent inroads AQAP has made into southern Yemen coupled with its 
continued domestic operations and its sophisticated attacks against U.S. interests are 
detrimental to the national security of the United States.  The United States, with a 
sometimes cooperative Yemen, has killed many of the top leaders of AQAP over the 
years.  Among these are al-Harithi, Qu’ayti, and the American-born Awlaqi.  Many more 
were  imprisoned, including former Guantanamo Bay detainee Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri, 
who was one of the planners of the U.S.S. Cole attack in 2000.84  However, the seeds of 
the problem have yet to be resolved.  As described above, the Saleh regime has proven 
itself to be more interested in regime survival than in permanently eradicating AQAP 
from Yemen.  Another example of Saleh’s duplicity was his treatment of Al-Nashiri.  
Before being handed over to the Central Intelligence Agency by the government of the 
United Arab Emirates, he was given high-level protection by the Yemeni government.85  
Thus, countering both the problem of a convincing narrative and the issue of ungoverned 
spaces in the face of a powerful AQAP in Yemen is the conundrum which the United 
States must now face.  Clearly, the United States must craft a new policy which is 
cognizant of how powerful AQAP has become with the help of the current domestic 
political climate in Yemen. 
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IV. COIN DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 The dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the decisive victory of the 
first Gulf War the same year, driving Iraq out of Kuwait, and the lack of any other 
credible military threat throughout the world led the United States to believe it was 
capable of defeating any aggression presented.   This perception pushed the U.S. to 
expand upon its capabilities and forge ahead with technological transformations that 
allowed the military to strike over long distances with speed and precision never before 
seen.  This drive was extolled and “proven” by the success in toppling the regimes in 
Afghanistan and Iraq between 2001 and 2003.  What came next was the type of “shock 
and awe” that the United States wasn’t expecting; A realization that not all enemies were 
willing to fight in the open and that U.S. strategy and policy wasn’t able to cope with the 
threat that faced it.  These threats came from the same people the U.S. government was 
trying to liberate and protect, creating a complex environment that required a change in 
strategic thinking and developing policies to protect and fight against the threats.86 
 These changes created a litany of doctrinal words and definitions to be placed into 
everyday soldiers’ vocabularies:  Insurgency, terror, terrorism, COIN, counterterrorism 
(CT) all became commonplace in everyday operations and media accounts.     For this 
chapter we briefly discuss basic insurgent growth factors before focusing on COIN, its 
background and how it relates to the challenges that are being encountered throughout the 
world and more specifically in Yemen.  The goal is for the reader to take away a better 
understanding of common COIN principles that will be used to structure future policy 
recommendations to counter the global insurgent threat of AQAP within the Middle East 
(ME). 
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B. DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE 
 By definition, an insurgency is “a protracted struggle conducted methodically, 
step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the 
overthrow of the existing order.87 In Robert Taber’s book, War of the Flea: The Classic 
Study of Guerrilla Warfare, further distinctions are made with regard to the insurgents’ 
goals to undermine one of the legitimate government’s four power bases: “(1) integrity of 
the borders and composition of the nation state, (2) the political system, (3) the 
authorities in power, and (4) the policies that determine who gets what in the society.”88 
Not all insurgencies have the same goals.  Some groups try to create their own ethnic 
nation-state separated by historical boundaries, some attempt revolutionary reform of 
their government, while others attempt to subvert the local and national authorities, 
allowing them to train and grow their organizations so they can export their message of 
violence to other nations and cultures. 
For any insurgent movement to become successful they must garner the support 
of the population.  The legitimate state, through its ability to provide security and civil 
support, typically maintains the immediate support of its citizens until an insurgency can 
sway their opinions.  Dr. Gordon McCormick, professor of Defense Analysis at the Naval 
Post Graduate School, identifies distinct characteristics of how insurgents mobilize and 
grow to a size that creates a “breaking point” for the state allowing an insurgency to 
dominate.  Dr. McCormick contends that in any insurgency or counterinsurgency fight, 
the population support is the absolute center of gravity.  To that end, both the insurgency 
and the state try to sway the population’s opinion in order to gain and maintain popular 
support.89 
An insurgency must show the population that it can be as strong, if not stronger, 
than the state.  This can manifest itself through overt and covert means, but ultimately 
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requires the insurgency to prove to the population its “perceived” size and strength 
outstrips the state’s security and influence.  An insurgency’s growth perception is critical 
to further gain strength, through inputs of people, money and weapons.  Insurgents must 
also protect their core group (cadre) members from destruction or capture.  If the core 
group disappears then the likelihood of the insurgency being capable of further growth is 
limited if not stopped completely.90 
 McCormick identifies that an insurgency has three methods at its disposal to gain 
popular support, through symbolic violence, overcoming its numbers deficit when 
attempting to grow.  The first is identified as the “agitation effect,” which is essentially 
armed propaganda that lets the population and the state know that the insurgency is there, 
watching, waiting, and projecting their vision of the struggle and what they are hoping to 
gain.  The second, “provocation effect,” uses violence against the state, forcing the state 
to recognize the insurgency as a threat and cause the state to over-retaliate.  The 
insurgency is invisible at this stage, and has information dominance over the state, 
maintaining a low profile is easy and forces the state to seek them out.  Over-retaliation, 
the insurgency’s goal, will cause the state to engage in excessive countermeasures and 
oppressive actions, thus pushing the population towards the insurgency.  The third, 
“demonstration effect,” is identified as the most important for an insurgency’s growth.  
Its goals are to make the insurgency appear strong, even if they are not, and make the 
state seem weak.  This projection shows the population that the state is ineffective and the 
insurgency will win, so the population should join them. 
C. COUNTERING THE GROWTH 
 The focus on COIN during the past ten years has produced volumes of research, 
data and opinions on how to best combat the growing threat around the world.  But this is 
not a new phenomenon and modern day insurgencies have much in common with 
perceived struggles a hundred years ago.    
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1. David Galula 
 Seen as the foundation for many theories and works on counterinsurgency, David 
Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice presents what he considers 
four “laws” that are peculiar to a counterinsurgency and the principles deriving from 
them.”91 
 The first law identifies that population support is essential for any 
counterinsurgent forces’ success in keeping the insurgent organization from returning to 
an area from which they have been pushed.  If the population doesn’t support the 
counterinsurgent force, the population will allow the insurgent force to return and rebuild 
its political institutions.92 
The second law works towards obtaining the population’s support.  Galula 
contends that in every population, during any event “there will be an active minority for 
the cause, a neutral majority, and an active minority against the cause.”93 To sway the 
population majority in favor of the counterinsurgent, it is imperative to identify and co-
opt the minority willing to organize and fight against the insurgent force, bringing about 
local change against an insurgent group.  Their goals would be the same as the insurgent 
force; sway the local population’s support in their favor.  This would allow the 
counterinsurgent force to deny sanctuary to the insurgency providing a victory for the 
counterinsurgent force.94 
The third law contents that support from the minority and the population are 
conditional upon the counterinsurgent’s ability to support their efforts against the 
insurgency.  If the counterinsurgent is unable to provide support through successful 
operations, security enforcement and the establishment/reestablishment of political grass 
roots organizations then the population will unlikely support the efforts of the 
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counterinsurgent.  The population is made up of people with desires and fears that are 
exploited by both sides.  The majority are unwilling to sacrifice themselves for futile 
operations and propaganda.95 
Galula’s fourth law identifies that the efforts of the counterinsurgent force must 
be conducted in a methodical manner that utilizes as many resources (assets, personnel 
&effort) in a particular area until the insurgency has been defeated or moved, allowing 
the counterinsurgent force to concentrate on a new area while not allowing the insurgent 
force to return.96 
Galula further presents an eight step strategy based on these laws: 
In a Selected Area:  
1. Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of 
armed insurgents. 
2. Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent’s comeback in 
strength, install these troops in the hamlets, villages, and towns where the 
population lives. 
3. Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut off 
its links with the guerillas. 
4. Destroy the local insurgent political organization. 
5. Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities. 
6. Test those authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Replace the 
softs and the incompetents; give full support to the active leaders. Organize self-
defense units. 
7. Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement. 
8. Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants. 97 
 
The steps of these operations support his work focusing on the population as the center of 
gravity.  The first four steps are operational in nature and deal with controlling the 
population and terrain, denying it from insurgent coercion.  The next three steps work 
with the population in setting up the political institutions and pressing the 
counterinsurgent ideology to re-establish order within the area. Once order has been 
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established within a particular area, these eight steps are to then be repeated in a different 
area that has been “taken over” by insurgent ideals.98 
2. David Kilcullen 
  
Dr. David Kilcullen’s work on the “three pillars” model (Figure 2) presents a 
simplistic framework for counterinsurgent cooperation between national and global 
agencies.  He identifies that this “approach builds upon ‘classical’ counterinsurgency 
theory, but also incorporates best practices that have emerged through experience in 
peacekeeping, development, fragile states and complex emergencies in the past several 
decades.”99   Dr. Kilcullen contends that the base or foundation of his model is 
information.  Without a proper information strategy the rest of model will not be 
effective. This strategy must encompass a unified message that explains the actions taken 
by the counterinsurgent as well as how to process intelligence when it is received.  
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Figure 2.   Kilcullen Three Pillar Model  
(From Air University). 
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Without this in place there will be confusion between different agencies competing to  
portray their messages at the local, national and global levels.100 
 The three pillars (security, political, economic) rising up from the foundation 
identify areas that need to be addressed and built upon in palrallel to one another, 
ensuring the proper balance to rebuilding an area.  Security is all encompassing of not 
only the military and police but also “incorporates human security, building a framework 
of human rights, civil institutions and individual protections, public safety (fire, 
ambulance, sanitation, civil defense) and popular security.”101  The political pillar 
attempts to mobilize the support necessary from the population.  It operates to rebuild the 
bureaucratic institution necessary for a functioning government to interact with the 
population.  The economic pillar provides immediate and long term assistance with 
programs to support the population.  Management of resources is key to making this 
pillar function properly.  Without proper management, resources can be stolen, or 
squandered on programs that don’t affect the largest population possible.102 
 Dr. Kilcullen identifies that control is the overarching goal of any 
counterinsurgent force.  To regain control is to not necessarily establish stability, a 
common endstate, but to “return the overall system to ‘normality.’”103  The normality of 
any region, argues Dr. Killcullen, will look different depending on the types of historical 
precedents of the society.104  What may be normal to the United States will not be normal 
for the tribesmen of Yemen.   Therefore, any counterinsurgent forces attempting to 
operationalize this model and control an area they are unfamiliar with must understand 
this concept before introducing ideals foreign to the population. 
 Within the concept of a “global insurgency,” Dr. Kilcullen identifies that many of 
the techniques and policies of past insurgencies must be rethought to take into account 
the many new nuances of a global threat, such as Al Qaeda.  Because classic 
counterinsurgency doctrine attempts to win over the population and deny sanctuary to the 
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insurgent threat, he believes this has become inadequate when dealing with groups and 
organizations.  These groups refuse to succumb to the same dilemmas as previous 
insurgents due in part to the relatively new concept of failing or failed nation states.  
These regional phenomena have provided ungoverned locations for global insurgent 
threats to take root and export their brand of ideological violence on whomever they 
target. To counter this threat, Dr. Kilcullen believes a combination of classical 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism techniques are required as the foundation for any 
new broad strategy to combat them.105 
3. FM 3–24: Counterinsurgency 
 The release of the Army Field Manual (FM) 3–24, in 2006, provided the military 
community a much needed update to how it was to doctrinally fight the insurgencies it 
faced on a day to day basis in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Written for the Battalion (BN) level 
staff and higher it provides the foundations to the causes of insurgencies and how best to 
counter them, especially when planning for full spectrum operations.  At its core FM 3–
24 draws upon the works of David Galula and is further operationalized for the military 
commander. 
 The primary objective of the COIN fight, according to FM 3–24, is to provide the 
assistance necessary to develop the legitimacy of the government with respect to the 
people.  The greater the legitimacy of the state, the greater chance it has to carry out its 
functions without coercion while an illegitimate state requires force and bribes to ensure 
population support.  It is up to the local commanders to identify how the population 
defines legitimacy.  As discussed in earlier works, not all regions, even those in the same 
nation state, will define it the same.  Any counterinsurgent force can claim initial success 
in a fight through kinetic operations, but without the successful application of legitimate 
governance the likelihood for continued long lasting success diminishes with the 
population’s resentment of the government.106 
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From the initial stages of a counterinsurgency campaign FM 3–24 recognized the 
requirement for a unity of effort across multiple agencies within the Department of 
Defense (DoD).  The COIN environment is identified by the multiple personalities, 
families, groups, tribes and governments.  Therefore, to provide the best strategy to 
combat an insurgency, these agencies must focus on what needs to be done and how to 
best accomplish this.  This grand strategy may have the military take a secondary role in 
the operations to ensure the population is supported appropriately, with the understanding 
that the military will encompass an extensive role within the COIN environment.  These 
roles may become kinetic in nature, attacking insurgent networks directly, or they can 
become static where the military is providing security for other governmental (GO) and 
non-governmental organizations (NGO) while they provide the necessary assistance and 
training to a host nation’s security and support apparatuses.107 
As with other COIN theory and doctrine, military COIN relies heavily on 
intelligence.  For the military commander intelligence doesn’t just include situational 
templates of the enemy.  Since COIN is dependent upon the support of the population 
information intelligence on the population is essential to successful operations.  This 
relies on the bottom up approach to intelligence gathering.  The units on the ground must 
be able to make an accurate assessment of the needs of the population and the influence 
of the insurgent force to send up an accurate picture of the situation.  Included in these 
assessments should be the breakdowns of the culture, social structures, norms and 
authoritative breakdown and anything else that will assist in creating a clear picture of 
any area.   This in turn needs to be integrated and fused at higher levels and shared 
laterally to insure an accurate representation is shared between services, agencies and 
other militaries.108 
Operationally, military COIN doctrine requires five distinct and interrelated 
efforts for successful execution.  The first requirement is the combined effort of the 
military and the host nation (HN) to devise a plan and define its objectives for tackling 
the insurgency and restoring the legitimacy of the HN.  Second, the HN must establish 
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control in areas that it can provide the population continuous support, both through 
security and bureaucratic assistance.  Third, the HN must secure its main population areas 
first, provide security and assistance to the population and then strike out to the more 
rural areas from its strongholds.  This will in effect show its ability to project power and 
thus strengthen its legitimacy.  Fourth, when the HN strikes out against the insurgency it 
must overwhelm and occupy the areas it is expanding into.  This will disrupt and displace 
the insurgent operational and political bases.  If the HN is able to do this and reestablish 
control over these functions it will be able to support and guide the population back 
towards the legitimate government.  Fifth, all operations whether kinetic or not, need to 
be accompanied by an aggressive Information Operations (IO) campaign that supports 
the message the HN is presenting.  The war of the people becomes the war of ideas.  If 
the HN is unable to articulate why the population should support the government and 
why the government is taking actions to disrupt the insurgency, their message will be lost 
and it will become harder to gain the loyalty of the population.109 
D. TYING IT ALL TOGETHER 
 The multiple theories, doctrines and practices on COIN implementation are varied 
to the specific environments they are attempting to explain.  There are, however, several 
similarities that can be taken away from them to help model future COIN operations.  
First and foremost is the understanding that the COIN environment is about the 
population and not about the insurgent force subverting the legitimate governments rule 
over it. Any operation conducted by a COIN force must be in support of the population 
and not subjugate them through force, threats or coercion.  The COIN force must also 
attempt to protect the population while conducting operations, maintaining collateral 
damages to the minimum in an attempt to not “create” more insurgents. Second, any 
COIN force hoping to become successful in an insurgent fight must have intelligence, not 
only on the insurgent forces but on the population, their structure and grievances.  Only 
with a complete picture of the environment can a COIN force hope to tailor is operations 
to support the people.  Third, the COIN force must be able to project security for the 
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population.  This may come in the form of military support, police enhancement, or 
social structure development within the region it is attempting to regain control over.  
Fourth the HN needs to insure there is “fair” distribution of social resources to areas that 
are relatively deprived.  These may include social services, humanitarian aid, and or 
distribution of natural resources wealth. 
 
  
Figure 3. Good and Bad Practices of COIN 
(From Paul et al., 2010). 
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But are there other factors that can be included in these practices?  The RAND 
Corporation conducted a study of 30 insurgencies from 1979–2006, utilizing the 
techniques in modern literature to identify distinct trends.  Their first assertion is 
successful COIN practices have a tendency to clump together.  These factors were 
identified and verified through multiple rounds of analysis and are seen as positive and 
negative factors towards COIN outcomes (Figure 3)110.   
These correlations of practices are strengthened by the analytical comparison of 
Rand’s 30 case studies.  It identified that the victorious COIN units in the case studies 
utilized a greater number of “good” COIN practices versus “bad” COIN practices.  
Conversely, if a COIN force utilizes more negative practices than good practices it can 
expect to lose the overall fight.111 
 The authors make seven recommendations based off these case studies, which 
may be used for future implementation and study.  The first is the understanding that you 
must have “multiple mutually supporting lines of operation in COIN [and you must] 
build and maintain forces that are capable of engaging in multiple mutually supporting 
lines of operations simultaneously.”112  This entails that all supporting elements in a 
COIN fight are resourced effectively and are given the latitude necessary to affect its 
outcome.  The next is ensuring that the HN is involved in COIN operations.  If the HN 
government is not part of the fight for legitimacy the likelihood of success in operations 
diminishes, especially in regions that are alien to the COIN forces.  Another 
recommendation is that the COIN force must maintain situational awareness of its 
progress with the COIN fight.  If they lose focus and the bad practices are utilized more 
often than the good practices the likelihood of success further diminishes.  A key take 
away is there is always time to change tactics when it is identified that the ones being 
used are not working.  The COIN environment is fluid and dynamic with changing 
characteristics.  The COIN force must recognize this and understand that even though a 
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certain practice worked in the past it may not work in the future and the force must be 
able to adapt to these changes.  Collective punishment and repression are traits of the 
insurgent forces and must not be adopted by the COIN force, the HN it is supporting or 
other foreign allies in support.  This may exasperate the situation and drive the population 
further away from the COIN force.  Finally, the COIN force must devise methods to 
strike at the insurgent logistical supply train, whether it comes from the population or 
from international support, developing a comprehensive strategy to affect it without 
causing damage to the COIN force’s standing within the region.113  
To further our research we will conduct a case study analysis of several different 
COIN operations that fit into the construct similar to Yemen.  In doing this we’ve 
attempted to identify cases that involved weak and/or illegitimate governance with a 
population disenfranchised by their leadership.  We also looked for cases with external 
COIN force involvement and their contributions for or against the HN. 
 Through these case studies we will attempt to identify the “good” practices of 
COIN operations that will allow us to prepare proposals for the future of Yemen and its 
government.     
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V. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
A. NICARAGUA: THE FALL OF SOMOZA 
1. Nicaragua Introduction 
 Prior to its downfall, the Somoza regime enjoyed more than forty years of neo-
patrimonial rule that used its position of power to subjugate the population and enrich the 
elite members of its cabinet.114  The wealthy minority enjoyed the privileges of wealth 
and status while the rest of the country lived in abject poverty.  The majority of the 
Nicaraguan society was forced to endure a declining quality of life that included a lack of 
health care, education, decent housing and adequate diet, while living under political 
tyranny.115  Over the years several opposition groups rose to challenge the Somoza 
regime only to be met with crushing defeat.  Resilience and determination allowed one 
such group to grasp the public’s attention and provide them with the necessary tools to 
grow and eventually take over the country. 
2. Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional 
 The Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (Sandinista Front for National 
Liberation: FSLN) was founded in 1961 by Thomas Borge and Carlos Fonseca.  Initially 
formed as a Marxist-Leninist organization, subscribing to the “foco”116 theory of 
insurgency, the Sandinista began attempting revolutionary uprising in the rural areas of 
Nicaragua in 1963.  Their attempt failed to take hold and grow the organization due to the 
strong Somoza security apparatuses in place at the time.  They continued to learn and 
evolve their tactics attempting to gain access to urban centers and then labor unions, none 
of which panned out.  The Sandinista abandoned the foco theory and rebranded 
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themselves Maoists in the hopes of alluring more people that may have been opposed to 
Communist fronts.  They attempted again to organize the peasants in 1967 and were met 
with extreme force by the Nicaraguan National Guard.  This force saw the majority of the 
Sandinista cadre killed or captured causing the few remaining members to flee to 
neighboring countries where they needed to rebuild their organization and finances.  The 
Somoza regime was convinced that this group of revolutionaries had been destroyed and 
no credible threat existed to oppose it.  Amongst the peasants and revolutionary-minded 
college students, though, the admiration and lore of the Sandinista grew and over the 
years steadily filled the organization with young, affluent Nicaraguan students looking 
for a change to the Somoza regime.117 
3. Somoza’s Government Fails the People 
In 1972, a large earthquake destroyed nearly 80 percent of the Nicaraguan capital, 
Managua, and killed more than 10,000 people.  The international community responded 
with generous amounts of aid that the Somoza regime used to become increasingly 
wealthy.  “The abysmal failure of the government to help the people purely because they 
were enriching themselves created an issue the Sandinista could use.”118  In the aftermath 
of the quake the Somoza regime asserted its power and took over areas of the economy 
typically reserved for the aristocratic elite that weren’t associated with Somoza or his 
regime.  This created a new segment of population alienation and disenfranchisement that 
the Sandinista were hoping to capitalize upon.  The Sandinista though were still 
considered a defeated revolution and needed to come out from the shadows to assert their 
preeminence over other insurgent organizations, taking the lead to resist Somoza.119 
 In 1974 the Sandinista conducted a daring raid that embarrassed the Somoza 
regime and pressed the FSLN back into the mainstream of Nicaraguan life.  Somoza 
responded with brutal tactics, imposing a state of siege to wipe out all guerrilla bands in 
the countryside.  The National Guard “imprisoned, brutalized, and killed not only 
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Sandinista fighters, but also hundreds of peasants suspected of helping them.”120  Not 
only was the National Guard attacking FSLN and their supporters, they were publically 
accused of widespread torture, rape and summary execution of civilians, furthering the 
disenfranchisement of the Somoza regime from the population and with allies who saw 
this COIN campaign as a violation of basic human rights.121 
4. The People Rise Up, the Insurgents Take Control 
 Through these abuses of power a grassroots uprising amongst the Nicaraguan 
people took hold.  Demonstrations against the government and protest rallies formed, 
with no apparent organization leading it.  The FSLN leadership latched onto this 
opportunity, coming out of hiding from the mountains and other countries, taking control 
of the movements, and unifying the multiple factions and political organizations.  The 
National Guard responded to these uprising and demonstrations with indiscriminate 
killings that further incensed the population.  The domino effect of these actions was 
more violent demonstrations that pressed the Somoza regime for its capitulation.  
Fighting in the streets and the indiscriminate killing were great victories for the FSLN 
and damning to Somoza.  “International attention was riveted on the carnage.  The 
National Guard’s furious assault was the most visible act of bloodletting in recent 
history.”122  The Sandinista used the media to exploit these events and further their cause. 
This tactic worked.  By the fall of 1978 the fight for revolutionary change in Nicaragua 
had become international.  A flow of arms and supplies began arriving for the FSLN from 
Costa Rica, shortly followed by Cuba and Venezuela.123 
 The United States attempted to mediate the events unfolding in Nicaragua but 
Somoza refused to agree to the demands of his strongest ally.  This in turn caused the 
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mediations to fail, forcing the United States to impose sanctions against the Somoza 
regime for human rights violations in February of 1979, and further boosting Sandinista 
political unity.124 
 The Sandinista’s growth from this point was exponential.  The increased support 
and Latin solidarity against the beleaguered regime swelled the revolutionary ranks.  
They began offensive attacks against Somoza’s forces and cities. Even though they were 
much smaller and still technologically inferior, they stretched the National Guard out; 
forcing them to defend selected areas and leaving others open for Sandinista occupation.  
The National Guard’s frustration with the turn in events was evident in their continued 
use of brutal tactics taken out on the population.  But the FSLN continued its attacks until 
Somoza, with United States’ assistance, bartered a cease fire to the hostilities and went 
into exile.  On July 19, 1979, the FSLN took control of the capital of Nicaragua, ending 
more than 40 years of U.S. backed dictatorship.125 
5. Nicaragua Conclusion 
 Comparing the “good and bad” COIN practices used in Nicaragua it is fairly clear 
why the Somoza regime failed and the FSLN won.  First and foremost, the regime failed 
to provide the population the basic necessities to ensure the regime’s legitimacy. The 
regime’s greed and lack of compassion for the population, manifested over several 
decades, drove a wedge between the government and the population, forcing the 
population to stand up for itself.  The government then failed to interact with the 
population and reestablish a positive relationship with them to work through their 
grievances.  Instead they sought to eliminate the perceived threat of the FSLN and 
indiscriminately attack the population, thus furthering their suffering.  The FSLN’s 
legitimacy with the population was enhanced over time and was furthered by the support 
of several other nations.  The external support provided by these nations and the 
sanctions emplaced by the United States, due to the Somoza’s brutal human rights 
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violations, eventually squeezed the Somoza regime into capitulation and exile, 
identifying how external actors may influence the overall outcome of a COIN fight.   
B. MALAYA:  THE BRITISH SUCCESS STORY 
1. Malaya Introduction 
By the time the British declared a state of emergency in Malaya, in June 1948, the 
Malayan Communist Party (MCP) had established itself as the leading opposition to the 
British rule with the intent to overthrow British governance and transform the nation into 
a communist republic. 
2. Malayan Communist Party 
 Established in 1930 as an overseas branch of the Chinese Communist Party, the 
MCP was organized to push for decolonization of Malaya by creating rifts between the 
population, its labor force and the British administration.  Their efforts leading up to the 
Japanese invasion in December 1941 were seen as merely a nuisance to the 
administration and weren’t dealt with as a typical insurgency.  The MCP was unable to 
sway a large number of groups or people to their cause since the majority of the MCP’s 
membership was ethnic Chinese, a minority within Malaya’s borders.126 
 During the Japanese occupation the MCP established and grew a guerrilla 
organization to fight the Japanese in the name of the Malayan people.  Organized as the 
Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), and provided training in guerrilla 
tactics by the British, these mostly Chinese volunteers were able to gain a considerable 
amount of recognition and prestige from the Malayans for their efforts to fight from the 
shadows.  This ability and growing lore allowed the MPAJA to swell its ranks and 
conduct minor attacks against the Japanese.  They weren’t overpowering in their abilities 
but were elusive enough to keep the Japanese guessing and labeling them as a “thorn in 
their sides.”127 
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 Following the abrupt end to WWII, the Japanese handed Malayan security over to 
the MPAJA for their administration of small towns and rural areas, which was further 
advanced by the British, upon their return, with the proclamation of the MPAJA’s official 
military status upgrade.128  The MPAJA used this opportunity to conduct racial 
retribution actions against those whom they claimed collaborated with the Japanese.  The 
MPAJA targeted mostly Malays and conducted a “reign of terror” that eroded the MCP’s 
chances of gaining support from the separate racial classes within Malaya.129 
 The returning British administration convinced the MPAJA to disarm and return 
to their lives as Malayan citizens, providing them with the opportunity for a better future 
than one of the jungle guerrilla.  The MPAJA agreed to disarm and disband as an 
organization.  This allowed MCP the opportunity to step up and create a “number of front 
organizations of a traditional Communist character.”130  The MCP then spent the years 
from 1945 to 1948 creating animosity within the labor class towards the British 
attempting to bring the government down.  They affiliated themselves and gained control 
of labor unions which allowed them to conduct frequent and bitter strikes.  They also 
turned their actions towards killings and abductions, creating an uncertain environment 
for the British government.131 
3. The British Return 
 In 1945 the British returned to a Malaya that was completely different from when 
they left.  Prior to the Japanese occupation, Malaya had been considered one of the most 
professional and best colonial police forces within the empire.  It was administered 
efficiently and retained some of the most highly trained individuals.  To be part of the 
Malayan police force an individual had to go through time intensive and rigorous training 
that was rewarded with higher than average pay resulting in the best applicants.  This 
force was utterly destroyed and rebuilding it in 1945 led the British to cut the standards of 
the applicants and their training requirements that made them such an effective force.  
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The new force was deployed throughout the country in small detachments that were easy 
targets for insurgent attacks.  The MCP used this opportunity to successfully target the 
British administration and their infrastructure as well as the wealthy business prospects 
from the rubber plants and tin mines, while gathering ever strengthening support from the 
population who began to see the British as an occupying force instead of the pre-war 
colonial force.132 
4. British COIN Operations – First Phase  
From 1948–1951 the British adopted a policy of “coercion and enforcement” to 
meet the threat posed by the MCP insurgency.  This first phase of the British 
counterinsurgency plan, tied to the ineptitude of the hastily rebuilt police force, showed 
the weakness in the British’s ability, at the time, to fight this type of warfare.  Standard 
practices during this period of time were the detention and deportation of all persons 
living within an area known to be used by insurgents, whether they were involved with 
the insurgency or not.  The British forces telegraphed their movements, using 
conventional practices to fight the insurgency, as if they were fighting the Germans in 
Europe, allowing the insurgents to disperse into the jungle regions before the British ever 
came close.  The Malayan military and police forces were brutal with their tactics to 
identify and clear insurgents from their safe havens, garnering a reputation that rivaled 
the Japanese in their treatment of the ethnic Chinese.  These tactics created a sense of 
isolation and despair for the Chinese community and furthered their distrust of the British 
government, pushing them to actively and passively support the insurgency allowing the 
MCP to grow to more than 8,000 members in 1951.133 
5. British COIN Operations – Second Phase  
The British, seeing their position in Malaya losing ground to insurgent 
Communism, appointed LTG Sir Harold Briggs, in 1950, to act as Director of Operations 
with the goal of bringing the insurgency under control.  The Briggs Plan that was 
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generally adopted called for a change in how units were to operate within the country.  
Briggs saw the need to dominate and build an area up, and then provide protection and 
administration.  He would do this in a step by step method moving methodically 
throughout the country to bring it under control again.  The plan also called for the 
relocation and resettlement of the ethnic Chinese population into securable and defensible 
compounds.  This showed the population they could be secured by the legitimate 
government, provided with basic necessities such as education, health care and clean 
water and give them a place where they wouldn’t be harassed by the police, army or 
insurgent personnel.  Briggs’ plan began to show results but he wasn’t able to see it 
through and had to leave Malaya for health reasons in 1951.134 
 Following LTG Briggs, the British entrusted LTG Sir General Templer with the 
job of defeating the insurgency and communist threat in Malaya and restore law and 
order.  Templer took with him a proclamation from the British Government that Malaya 
would become a free and independent nation after the insurgency had been defeated.  
One of Templer’s first accomplishments was to unify and energize the civilian 
administrations.  He went out to the settlements and met with the population to hear their 
grievances and gauge the situation for himself. This allowed him to craft and implement 
“the Malayan Government’s policy…to be known as the ‘hearts and minds 
approach.’”135 
 Templer and his staff increased the professionalization of the police force, 
improving its reputation with the Malayan communities.  They also implemented a “stick 
and carrot” approach to dealing with population centers that supported or denied the 
insurgents access.  The most compelling of these approaches was the use of food 
rationing to coerce government support from villages that actively supported insurgent 
movements.  Carrot operations were used to support communities who worked with the 
government by providing social services and long term land titles. The largest of the 
carrots was the promise of decolonization and the creation of the independent Malayan 
state once the insurgency was defeated.   In conjunction with these actions, the hearts and 
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minds strategy utilized propaganda against the insurgency by targeting population centers 
with government newspapers and radio messages aiding their attempts to win over the 
population.136 
 Within a short period of time the shift in policy and professionalization of the 
security forces began to show positive results.  The MCP’s operations were shifted from 
offensive to defensive with the number of attacks steadily decreasing.  The government 
was able to build effective administrative and social service distribution networks as well 
as provide agricultural land to the population.  Intelligence networks increased 
significantly, allowing the insurgent network to be exposed to the government for 
targeting forcing the insurgency to move away from population centers and back into the 
jungles where they lacked logistical support for their operations.  By 1954 a stalemate 
had been declared between the two forces and both sides were looking for ways to 
expand their organizational bases and regain momentum.137  It took another six years for 
the emergency to come to a conclusion, and was made possible by the patient, long-term 
approach the government took to fulfill its strategy.  Eventually, the insurgency’s support 
was eliminated due to the implementation of good governance practices, such as new 
social support practices and improved security policies.  The resulting increased visibility 
of the insurgent network rendered it visible to attack, because they had to leave the jungle 
in search for support from other sources.  The government claimed victory over the 
insurgency, ending the emergency in 1960. 
6. Malaya Conclusion 
 The British and Malayan governments were able to claim victory over the MCP 
insurgency after a long and protracted effort.  The initial stages of the insurgency allowed 
the MCP to grow exponentially not only because of their actions but because of the brutal 
tactics initially used to fight them.  The British attempts to stop the insurgency from 
1948–1951 can be classified as classical mistakes of a COIN force. Mass ethnic 
retribution and brutal tactics were seen as polarizing actions that disenfranchised the 
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population and delegitimized the government.  The second phase of the insurgency 
showed the British doctrine could evolve and was capable of changing direction when 
confronted with a losing strategy.  The hearts and minds campaign, forever coined in 
modern lexicons, showed the necessity to adopt policies that support the population and 
folds them into society rather than segregate and intimidate them.  The collective 
punishment of food rationing and forced relocation may lead to polarize a population and 
is seen today as counterproductive COIN practices.  These tactics worked for the British 
in Malaya but to repeat these actions in other countries would have to be done very 
carefully and after considerable consideration to the effects on the local population.   
C. SOMALIA: THE FAILURE OF A STATE 
1. Somalia Introduction 
 The Somali state drastically changed in 1969 beginning with the assassination of 
the country’s President, Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, which left the country and the 
government in a political vacuum.   This gaping hole in Somali governance led to a 
bloodless coup by the top military commander, General Mohamed Siyad Barre, who led 
the country down a path of wanton destruction from which it has never recovered.138 
2. Re-identification of the Population 
 Attempting to change the national identity of the population, Barre dismantled the 
governing bodies and bureaucracies of Somalia and replaced them with the Supreme 
Revolutionary Council (SRC), which he presided over, and set up regional councils in its 
image.  The SRC’s stated goals were to bring the Somali people together and end the 
tribal divisions that had “plagued” the country.  Barre called for the end of the tribal 
nepotism and to re-establish a system of governance that stressed economic and social 
betterment for the entire population and not just the privileged few.  His new government 
would be founded on Scientific Socialism – wealth sharing based on wisdom—that 
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would reshape and restructure the Somali national identity by demonizing the tribal 
structure that the population had been accustomed to.139 
 To accomplish this Barre set up programs to educate the masses and provided 
volumes of propaganda on how to become a better Somali citizen.  Initially the 
population supported Barre and the military regime.  They had viewed the military 
favorably, identifying them as one of the main reasons Somalia had experienced early 
success as a country.  But Barre took the transformation several steps further than the 
population had expected.  To maintain his credibility and control over the country, he 
ordered the SRC to conduct investigations into the lives and political positions of key 
personnel within the government and the larger community.  If they were found to not 
fully support the Barre regime they were removed from their positions, with common 
sentences of jail time and even execution.  Any acts that were deemed to be subversive 
toward Barre’s regime were dealt with in a very strict manner.140 
 From 1969 to 1975 the transformation provided mixed results.  The population 
enjoyed a measure of self-reliance that produced enthusiasm at the individual level, the 
education rate increased, and the illiteracy rate decreased due to Barre’s adoption of the 
Roman alphabet, allowing the Somali language to become written and taught to the 
masses for the first time.141   In conjunction with his successes though, Barre’s regime 
employed brutal and undermining tactics to maintain his power base which frustrated the 
society at large and made them hostile towards his policies.  “The state authority and 
domination relied on coercion rather than fair competition between various social forces 
in society.”142  The state was not legitimized by a foundation in good governance and 
was prone to political instability that was balanced by Barre’s ability to promote and 
demote public figures as well as divide the tribes he claimed he wanted to bring together.  
Barre believed that if he was able to balance the tribal influences through systems of 
patronage and maintain tensions between them, not allowing any one tribe to become too 
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powerful, he would be able to maintain his ability to control the entire state.  Police, 
military, special state emergency laws and special units were used in conjunction to 
coerce the population further entrenching the population within their tribes.  The 
population began to feel as if they could trust no one outside of their closest relatives and 
lineage members.143 
3. Insurgent Groups Emergence 
 By 1975 the population had watched and tired of the extrajudicial killings of its 
citizens.  The ultimate attack against their identity came with the execution of 10 
religious figures that refused to preach the teachings of the state in their mosques and 
maintained their Islamic beliefs.  The people saw that the Barre regime wasn’t delivering 
on its promises and began to look for alternatives.  The neglect in infrastructure 
development, issues with large numbers of refugees from persistent droughts, and the 
direct military rule wasn’t the new Somalia they had supported after the coup.144 
 Following a failed invasion of Ethiopia 1977, where more than 8,000 soldiers 
were killed and more than 600,000 citizens were displaced, several insurgent groups 
began to emerge and challenge the Barre regime.  The Somali Salvation Defense Front 
(SSDF) formed in Ethiopia, receiving funding from Ethiopia and Libya, and began to 
conduct cross border operations against easy targets.  The Somali National Movement 
(SNM), funded by the Somali diaspora residing in Gulf states, East Africa and various 
western countries and the United Somali Congress (USC); founded by members of the 
repressed Hawiye tribe (largest in Somalia) all began to rise up from the desert and 
challenge Barre authority.145 
4. Barre Fails to Defeat Insurgents 
Barre’s reactions to these new insurgent threats were enough to keep them from 
growing into organizations that couldn’t attempt anything more than hit and run attacks.  
He expanded his COIN force to 120,000 troops but failed to rebuild the military to 
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effectively deal with insurgent tactics.  His forces employed collective repression and 
escalating indiscriminate violence in attempts to destroy the insurgents with 
overwhelming forces.  Barre’s tactics and oppressive policies were aimed at the 
population as a whole and drove outright support towards the insurgencies.  The public 
began to push the insurgents for more attacks against the regime and to take advantage of 
the support they offered.  From June 1985 through February 1986 the SNM claimed to 
have killed more than 500 government soldiers in 30 operations.  The SNM’s leadership 
had learned from their mistakes and became skilled in developing their organization and 
leadership bases.  Through their attacks they were able to recruit more members into their 
organization and by 1988 were able to mount complex attacks that Barre’s forces were 
unable to defend against.  Their attacks were “so surprising and tactically destructive that 
[the Barre regime] was rendered incapable of careful, planned and effective 
resistance.”146 By May of 1988 the SNM captured the cities of Buro and Hargeisa.  This 
is seen as a major turning point for the insurgency, galvanizing the other insurgent 
groups’ resolve and banding them together with the SNM.147 
 Barre’s response was brutal and unforgiving.  He ordered air strikes and artillery 
barrages against areas believed to be insurgent strongholds, killing more than 35,000 
civilians and displacing thousands more.  Somali pilots, ordered to continue the onslaught 
but appalled by the slaughter, began to defect to Ethiopia.  Barre dispatched his special 
forces to continue the attacks against suspected insurgents, killing all those suspected of 
being subversive.  These forces were more indiscriminate, reportedly conducting 
widespread looting, raping and killing of the local populous.  Mercenary pilots were 
brought in from South Africa and Zimbabwe to replace the Somali Air Force pilots who 
had defected.  But these forces weren’t enough to counter the ability or support the 
insurgent groups were wielding.  By 1991the COIN force had deteriorated, the insurgents 
were more powerful than the army and the Barre regime had ended in complete disaster. 
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Barre fled the country and the government collapsed, leaving it open for the insurgent 
groups to conduct infighting for control which has left it incapable of forming a central 
government to this day.148 
5. Somalia Conclusion 
 The Somalia case proved that the support from the population was paramount to 
the insurgent’s success.  The COIN force’s inability to stop the flow of tangible and 
intangible support towards the insurgent networks was exasperated by the fact the 
population felt the government was a worse option than the insurgent groups and their 
assistance was the pivotal point in the regime’s downfall.  The insurgents enjoyed 
sanctuary in ungoverned territory which provided them the space and logistics support 
necessary to recruit, grow, and educate the force needed to fight.  The Barre regime 
exasperated the use of “bad’ COIN practices through its continual self-destructive use of 
indiscriminate acts of violence, pushing the population to actively support the insurgent 
forces.  The Barre regime’s COIN force, stemming from their frustrations to stave off 
insurgent attacks, fought against the insurgents and civilians with air, artillery, looting 
and rape, completely delegitimizing the government.  The government’s policies 
bolstered the insurgent network’s rank and file with eager recruits to fight against Barre, 
ultimately ending his rule and driving the country into political chaos. 
D. CONCLUSION 
 These case studies’ diversity, with the type of regimes fighting insurgents, the 
outcomes of each fight and how each governing force implemented COIN were 
specifically chosen to provide a well-rounded view of successful and failed COIN 
practices.  The common thread identified is the need for the government to conduct itself 
in a manner that doesn’t alienate and delegitimize itself with the population.  The 
population is the ultimate factor in a successful COIN campaign and great care must be 
taken to ensure actions taken by the COIN force are for the betterment of the population 
and not an attack or suppression of their lives.   
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 These factors are important when we discuss how to work with the Yemeni 
government.  COIN doctrine states that we must work with the central government to 
fight off the insurgents.  But what do we do when the incumbent regime is deemed 
illegitimate within the eyes of the population?  How do external actors, like the United 
States, assist the Yemeni government with its fight against AQAP when the government 
is besieged by its population, clamoring for revolution, and rolling with the momentum of 
the Arab Spring?  How does the United States maintain its campaign to fight AQAP and 
maintain its legitimacy while working with an illegitimate government, therefore all 
actions taken are perceived as illegitimate?  In the next chapter we will provide answers 
to these questions and provide recommendations for future operations within Yemen and 









Yemen and the Saleh regime face a multitude of dilemmas that threaten the 
viability of Yemen as an independent nation state.  Even without the threat of a global 
insurgency, Yemen faces dire resource challenges.  It is forecasted to run out of potable 
water within the next decade, which will directly affect all its twenty four million 
inhabitants.  Its oil revenue, which has fueled the government’s ability to maintain its 
patronage system, is rapidly decreasing due to lower outputs.  And the recent uprising in 
Sana’a in support of the Arab Spring weakened President Saleh’s tenuous grip over the 
country, and his standing in the international community, to the point that he officially 
resigned as president and handed over his power to his vice president, Abed Rabo 
Mansour al-Hadi, on November 23, 2011.149 But this “win” for the people and the 
country may be shallow and short lived. 
  The United Nations (UN) support of the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council’s 
(GCC) proposal, outlining “a process for a peaceful, inclusive, orderly and Yemeni-led 
transition of power from President Saleh”150 opens up avenues for international support 
to flow to the people and assist in redefining the current government structure.  But it also 
is mired in controversy. As a condition for acceptance of the GCC’s proposal, President 
Saleh was allowed retain his title and some privileges until the new elections are held in 
February.  Furthermore, President Saleh has been granted immunity from prosecution 
protecting him from the multiple human rights violations he has committed during his 33 
years in power.151 
Saleh, we contend, will still be a driving force within the Yemeni government, at 
least in the near future.  As testament to this, Saleh’s resignation hasn’t taken on tangible 
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qualities of a deposed leader.  He has been very public in his recognition of the protesters 
and their attacks, and the loyalist militias fighting to keep him in power.  He made a 
public decree on November 27, 2011 to declare a “general amnesty for people whom had 
committed ‘follies’ during the uprisings…but made an exception for those responsible for 
the bombing that badly wounded him.”152 
President Saleh’s power base is unlikely to change with the February 2012 
presidential election.  His Vice President, Mr. Hadi, is currently the only candidate 
expected to run leaving the status quo unchanged if someone else isn’t able to step 
forward and wrest control away from him.  Furthermore, President Saleh’s family 
members maintain critical positions within the military and intelligence services, 
maintaining a grip on the country.153 Without significant change to the government, we 
contend that the Saleh regime in its current form and as discussed above, will stay intact 
and all the negative factors regarding its illegitimate governance will continue to drive 
the country to the brink of disaster. 
These issues taken together create a situation with explosive possibilities, ones 
which most countries are not willing to tackle.  But the United States has pledged, as one 
of its primary security goals, to eradicate al-Qaeda and its affiliates no matter where they 
attempt to find sanctuary.  The United States’ current partnership with the Yemeni 
government is one of mutual benefit.  It receives substantial monetary aid that is used to 
entrench the Yemeni elites, ensuring their loyalty to whoever pays them.  Also, the 
United States is allowed to conduct CT missions against identified AQAP members from 
remote locations like Djibouti.  When these missions are successful, it becomes national 
news to extol the continued effort to fight AQ.  However, what isn’t discussed is how 
these CT operations may cause more harm than good. 
Yemeni tribal society doesn’t identify itself with a national moniker.  A Yemeni 
sees him/herself as a tribe member first and foremost, and lives by the rule of the tribe, 
not the government.  Within tribal society there are three types of broad relationships: 
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Patrons to the tribe, clients of the tribe, and partners with the tribe. An outsider must 
establish himself through one of these relationships in order to operate effectively inside 
tribally governed lands.154 
The Saleh regime is mostly viewed as a patron of the tribes and doesn’t command 
their loyalties past the revenue stream provided from Sana’a.  As the resources dwindle 
the support the government is able to buy is proportionately dwindling as well.  AQAP is 
taking a different approach to garner tribal loyalty.  They are attempting to, and in some 
cases succeeding, partner with the tribes.  Through a shared identity and distrust of the 
central government, AQAP’s influence and clout increases.  They work with the tribes 
directly, providing security and support the central government is not capable or willing 
to provide.  They are working with the tribal leaders to set up social welfare and 
education programs for the population, galvanizing tribal support while demonizing the 
government.  Recent operations to overtake two cities in Abyan province show AQAP’s 
resolve to further their cause, while being supported by the tribes who feel neglected by 
the government. 
Within this construct, the United States is attempting to assist the government 
while furthering its cause by targeting and killing valuable AQAP targets.  These attacks 
have mostly been conducted by aerial drones with “smart weapons.”  These attacks, 
while effective at maintaining a minimum footprint within the region, are not going to be 
able to defeat AQAP in Yemen, nor sway public opinion towards supporting the 
government or the United States’ efforts.  When remote attacks are exasperated by 
collateral damage, AQAP is on the ground with the resources necessary to further 
entrench themselves with the tribes.  They call on the tribes to denounce the government 
as corrupt and a puppet of the United States, further delegitimizing the efforts of both 
governments to clear the insurgency out.  These actions create a positive feedback loop 
that increases the size of the insurgency with more bodies than the dead ones by the 
attack.     
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To truly counter the growth of AQAP we contend the international community 
must adopt a multinational COIN approach that attempts to leverage the governing bodies 
within Yemen.  The case studies presented in the previous chapter outline the 
effectiveness of good and bad COIN practices and their ability to sway the population’s 
opinion and support for or against the incumbent regime.  The Malaya case study showed 
that given enough time and understanding of the local environment coupled with good 
COIN practices, a regime under siege can become legitimate and maintain its power.  
Through good governance the population will turn away from supporting insurgent 
activities and show their unity towards the central government.  The Nicaragua and 
Somalia case studies present the outcomes of bad COIN fights.  Indiscriminate repression 
of the population, human rights violations and patronage systems emplaced to forcibly 
control the populations opinions have shown to shorten the life spans of the incumbent 
regimes.   
For COIN in Yemen to be effective, a status of legitimacy must be established 
between the COIN force and the population.  Whether or not this is conducted in 
conjunction with the established government, on their behalf, or without them will be 
based on the Saleh regime’s ability to reverse its current path of destruction and stave off 
its demise.  The next three sections will identify how COIN practices implemented 
through various methods may or may not be effective.  We will first look at how COIN 
with the current regime may be perceived by the population and its effectiveness.  
Second, we look at circumventing the central government’s authority and establishing a 
grassroots COIN campaign.  Third, we assume the Saleh regime will be resistant to our 
attempts to conduct COIN in the previous two models, resulting in policy implementation 
that causes the central government to fail, creating a failed state scenario requiring 
international support and aid to stave off resulting humanitarian crises. 
B. COIN SUPPORTING THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
 As discussed in Chapter IV one of the primary tenants of COIN doctrine is to 
work with and build up the central government, expand its ability to provide good 
governance, improve its relationship with its population, and show its ability and resolve 
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to project power to strengthen its legitimacy.  “Legitimacy of the state…in the Western 
mindset depends upon the national government’s ability to be a meaningful entity in the 
lives of its citizens, a conception that joins it with sate-centric COIN doctrine.”155 
Building upon the historical frameworks of counterinsurgent academics, FM 3–24 
outlines a holistic approach to a COIN campaign that returns a faltering state, under siege 
of an insurgent threat, to a level that allows it to govern independently from external 
support.  Beginning with the central government, this type of COIN campaign works to 
bolster and rebuild the security and social apparatuses that have failed the population and 
allowed the insurgency to take root and grow. These actions would bolster the central 
government to push out of its entrenched position and reach out to the population it has 
previously been unable or unwilling to support.  These actions would allow the 
government to secure and provide for the population furthering its goal to regain the 
legitimacy it had lost. 
1. Required Actions 
For the United States to consider taking on this problem we must look at how our 
actions would be perceived.  Currently, the government is under multiple attacks from 
various factions.  The Southern Secessionist Movement, Houthi Rebellion and AQAP are 
all vying to accomplish their goal but aren’t the most pressing problem being addressed 
by the government.  The uprisings and demonstrations against the Yemeni government, 
incensed from the victories of the Arab Spring, have turned deadly.  As recently as 
November 11, 2011, Saleh’s regime butchered his own people in an attempt to put down 
the uprisings in the city of Taiz, killing at least fifteen people and firing artillery upon 
hospitals that care for the wounded protesters.156 These actions clearly show a 
government that was unwilling to work with its population to identify and work through 
grievances, therefore further delegitimizing its role with the population.  Furthermore, the 
                                                 
155 David C. Ellis and James Sisco, “Implementing COIN Doctrine in the Absence of a Legitimate 
State,” Small Wars Journal, October 13, 2010, 7, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/implementing-coin-
doctrine-in-the-absence-of-a-legitimate-state. 
156 Laura Kasinof, “Yemeni Forces Heighten Deadly Assault on Protesters in City Central to 
Uprising,” New York Times Online, November 11, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/12/world/middleeast/government-forces-kill-at-least-15-in-
yemen.html?_r=1&ref=yemen (accessed November 12, 2011). 
 74 
actions taken against these armed uprising show the central government doesn’t 
understand that their role is to protect the people, not conduct mass retribution against 
them.   
 Any action then taken on the behalf of the central government to help quell the 
violence and bring these armed rebellions under control will be viewed as illegitimate.  If 
the United States were to come to the aid of the government and attempt to conduct 
COIN operations and rebuild the state, even without President Saleh’s presence, the 
entire operation would be viewed as “imperialistic” and illegitimate.  The propaganda 
generated by aligning the United States, in a greater role than it is currently involved, 
would be counterproductive.  Like the deposed regimes of Nicaragua and Somalia, the 
brutal tactics and indiscriminate killings are leading towards the regime’s failure.  This 
time of civil unrest and uprisings allows AQAP to continue its expansion and fight 
against the central government generating support and greater legitimacy for its cause. 
 
COA #1:  COIN Supporting the Central Government 
Required Actions: 
1. COIN doctrine provides holistic approach to reestablishing state legitimacy 
2. Legitimacy depends on a government’s ability to provide security and social services for the 
population 
3. Legitimacy is gained when the population believes the government can provide more than 
the insurgency can with respect to security and services 
Pros: Cons: 
1. Central government is recognized by the 
international community 
2. United States has working relationship 
with Yemen government to conduct CT 
operations against AQAP 
1. Government has lost control of its 
population 
2. Any action taken on behalf of an 
illegitimate government is illegitimate by 
association 
3. Yemen has no history of national identity 
to tie its population to the government. 
COIN in Support of the Saleh Regime 
2. Recommendation 
 The Saleh regime slipped down a path from which it couldn’t recover.  President 
Saleh’s resignation and the upcoming presidential elections are unlikely to change the 
societal dynamics within Yemen, especially as the Yemeni population has never had an 
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identity beyond the tribe.  For these reasons, we don’t recommend the United States 
conduct COIN operations in conjunction with the central government.  The U.S. actions 
would not be welcomed nor appreciated.  The amount of negative publicity generated by 
the intrusion of U.S. COIN forces would be enough to polarize the population no matter 
how much aid would be delivered to the population.   
C. GRASSROOTS COIN AT THE VILLAGE/TRIBE LEVEL 
 Realizing traditional COIN techniques through the Yemeni government will not 
work; the next step is to consider centralizing all COIN efforts at the tribal level.  COIN 
at this level would consist primarily of security and civil projects to improve the areas of 
Yemen which were long neglected by the Saleh government.  These projects would be 
led by the international community, as the tribes would look unfavorably on the U.S. 
leading the effort.  While many tribes benefit monetarily from the patronage payments 
from the government, such payoffs are tied to perceived loyalty.  In this way, receipt of 
such benefits is contingent on whim and not necessity.  This course of action 
recommends bypassing the central government and focusing COIN efforts where they 
can best be used – at the village level where AQAP has found safe areas from which to 
recruit, train, and operate.   
1. Required Actions 
Bypassing the central government is attractive for the same reasons that 
coordinating a multinational COIN approach through the central government is not 
feasible.  For example, the monies spent would go directly toward improving the areas of 
Yemen which need it the most.  The tribal areas in Southern Yemen have been long 
neglected by the government.  By focusing effort in these areas, the international 
community can provide the population with such civic services as schools, sustainable 
farming techniques, and infrastructure and governance needs.  The COIN force used 
would also spend much effort in providing security in these areas against AQAP 
activities.    
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Unfortunately, the current situation in Yemen precludes this course of action.  
While facing many problems, Yemen is still a sovereign nation, and the government is 
still powerful.  It controls most of the military within the country, and still receives 
substantial monetary support from several international donors, including the United 
States.  As such, it would never allow the international community to conduct 
counterinsurgency operations without working through his government.  The same can be 
said for the United Nations, whose support would be required in this scenario.  The UN 
would be very unlikely to support any action that does not work through the nation-state. 
Another problem with this course of action is that it does not provide avenues for 
solving several of Yemen’s other problems.  Among the most important of these is the 
way in which the government has dealt with the problems it feels are more pressing:  the 
Houthi Rebellion, and the Southern Secessionist movement.  While still in power, 
government will continue to use a heavy hand against his people.  In other words, this 
course of action fails to address the illegitimacy of the government.  The tribes have been 
subjected to repeated foreign intervention.  They would therefore likely view the 
international community with disfavor if it were to circumvent the central government, as 
this course of action prescribes.  The only way the tribes would view an intervening force 
with favor is if they were to act directly against both AQAP and the Saleh regime, while 
providing the basic services required for a functioning population.  This intervention 
would provide ample fodder for the AQAP narrative, which is already receiving support 
from the village level in Yemen as it fills the gaps left by the government. 
 
COA #2:  Grassroots COIN, Bypassing Central Government 
Required Actions: 
1. Bypass the central government and target the population directly 
2. Work with the tribes and villages to address basic security and services needs 
3. Call for International Community to do the same (especially Saudi Arabia and UN) 
4. Continue to conduct CT operations within Yemen’s borders 
Pros: Cons: 
1. Bypasses the biggest roadblock 
2. Involves international community 
1. Yemeni government and international 
community will not allow it 
2. Narrative windfall for AQAP 




While the type of regime Saleh created remains in power, this course of action is 
untenable.  The power it wields would make it impossible to provide the tribes with the 
basic services and security they need.  If this type of action is undertaken with the current 
government still in control, the resulting narrative windfall to AQAP would be 
catastrophic to those who oppose the group.  Still, the merits of conducting COIN at the 
village level without interference from the Saleh regime cannot be ignored.  It is these 
merits which lead us to our third considered course of action. 
D. ASSIST IN FALL OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
 The third course of action is to act towards a real change in government 
leadership and practices, while simultaneously fostering sustained relationships with 
tribal-level powerbrokers.  As previously discussed, the Yemeni government is the source 
of many of the problems the country faces today.  The Saleh regime repeatedly hindered 
the United States’ efforts to eradicate AQAP and will likely do so in the foreseeable 
future.  The government has also allowed AQAP to grow more powerful through its 
uneven efforts against the group.  Furthermore, the government has – on several 
occasions – allowed AQAP members to escape from its prisons and refused to either 
extradite or prosecute known terrorist members within its borders.   Compounding this 
problem is the government’s illegitimacy in the eyes of the Yemeni population.  A 
generation of rampant corruption through its patronage practices, resource 
mismanagement, and heavy-handed use of its military has squandered what little 
goodwill the people of Yemen felt toward its central government.  It is little wonder that 
the tribes willingly listen to the AQAP narrative. 
1. Required Actions 
 This course of action posits that the biggest roadblock in countering the growing 
influence of AQAP is the government itself.  In this regard, the United States has been 
part of the problem.  Virtually all of the aid the U.S. provides goes directly to the central 
government.  While the intention was for these funds to be used for Yemen’s CT efforts 
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against AQAP, the Saleh regime diverted these monies for other purposes.  Over the 
years, President Saleh used his American-trained security forces to quash Arab Spring 
protesters in Sana’a and elsewhere.  The United States should therefore cease all 
monetary donations which go directly to the central government in Yemen until the Saleh 
regime has been disposed of in its entirety.   
 Instituting such a policy is not without peril.  There is the possibility that 
somebody much like President Saleh could take over administration of the government, 
and rule it in much the same way that Saleh has for the past 33 years.  However, this 
outcome is unlikely for two key reasons.  First, President Saleh has proved to be 
unusually adept at manipulating both domestic and foreign audiences into providing 
support.  It is highly unlikely that anybody who takes his place will possess the same 
amount of skill.  Furthermore, the tides that have risen against the Saleh regime are quite 
powerful.  With his removal, the voices calling for change are much louder and clearer 
than before.  Additionally, powerful forces—including military commanders and 
powerful people from his own clan—have withdrawn their support.  These same forces 
will be wary of any replacement who they feel may follow the same set of policies which 
the Saleh regime promoted.   
 On the other hand, there are many positive aspects to this course of action.   Most 
prominent among these is that the type of regime Saleh presided over will no longer hold 
sway over the population.  With no central authority to quell popular uprisings through 
violent suppression, not only will the previously silenced voices be heard, but the tribes 
will find once again that they are strong.  The importance of the population is apparent 
when comparing the Somalia case study to the current situation in Yemen.  In Somalia, 
Barre squandered the initial support he had by alienating the population by dividing the 
tribes through patronage, mass killings, and strong-arm tactics throughout his rule.  The 
Somalia case points to the need for any COIN movement to have the support of the 
population if it is to ever successes.  With that in mind, any government that comes after 
the Saleh regime will either be more inclusive of formerly disparaged population sets, or 
will be administered at the tribal level.  Either of these prospects is more amenable for the 
United States to secure its interests, and will be more beneficial for Yemen as well. 
 79 
 For example, the United States will find it easier to coordinate and execute 
(through tribal power brokers, for example), simple kinetic operations against AQAP.  
Several studies have shown that terrorist organizations flourish where the state is badly 
governed, as opposed to ungoverned.157  Thus, even if Yemen was to completely fail as a 
state, the conduct of CT operations would be facilitated, not hindered. 
 Furthermore, Yemen will learn just how hollow the AQAP narrative really is.  
While it has convincingly argued against the Saleh regime, it does not provide a viable 
alternative method of governance.  With Saleh’s removal, AQAP will find itself without 
a subject for its narrative.  Without a convincing narrative, AQAP’s attractiveness will 
quickly wear off. 
In order to capitalize on the benefits of a post-Saleh Yemen, the United States 
should call for, and assist in, increased support for Yemen.  Support from the GCC and 
the UN will be particularly important on this front.  Through direct tribal engagement 
with monies and material resources, the international community will be able to foster 
sustained positive relations with the Yemeni population.  These positive relations will 
directly result in an information advantage for the forces against AQAP, with a 
corresponding reduction in safe havens, especially in the southern Yemeni provinces. 
Perhaps the largest benefit to be gained from this course of action is that the 
Yemeni people will be able to guide their own future.  While some may argue that the 
tribes will be unable to solve the problems of scarce resources and an inadequate 
education system, any action they take will be better than inaction, which has been the 







                                                 
157 Ken Menkhaus, Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism (New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 71–72. 
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COA #3:  Assist in Fall of the Saleh Regime 
Required Actions: 
1. Withdraw monetary support for the Saleh regime.  Redirect monies toward direct tribal 
engagement efforts 
2. Call for International Community to do the same (especially GCC and UN) 
3. Continued CT operations against AQAP 
Pros: Cons: 
1. Removes the biggest roadblock 
2. Yemen can chart its own future 
3. Removal of AQAP safe havens 
4. Unmasks AQAP narrative limitations 
5. Easier to conduct CT operations 
1. Unclear who would succeed  current 
regime 
2. Potential for catastrophic state 
collapse leading to civil war 
3. Requires long term, resource intensive 
commitment to stabilize country and 
region while countering AQAP  
Assist in the Fall of the Central Government 
2. Recommendation 
This course of action is the most advantageous, allowing for continued kinetic and 
non-kinetic operations against AQAP, while treating the root issues which have allowed 
AQAP to grow in the country.  The Yemeni tribes will be able to govern themselves and 
plan for Yemen’s future.  As such, it has the best prospects of eradicating AQAP, which 
is the United States’ primary goal. 
E. CONCLUSION 
 The purpose of this thesis has been to identify how the United States can 
effectively use COIN to counter the AQAP threat emanating from Yemen.  The case 
studies presented identified the good and bad practices of COIN that every policy maker, 
commander, and tactician must look at before implementation of them.  The primary 
concern of every COIN fight is the hearts and minds of the people.  Without their support 
no COIN force can hope to succeed in creating a long term stable environment that 
fosters economic growth.   
 With respect to Yemen, analyzing the many facets of the Yemeni governance, 
rebellions, succession and AQAP conundrum brings us to a potential chaotic course of 
action.  It is our findings that the current Yemeni state is not viable for long-term success: 
to counter AQAP influence, to increase quality of life for the population, or to deal with 
 81 
the resource shortages plaguing Yemen’s future.  Therefore, we contend that to be able to 
apply COIN doctrine effectively and further the United States’ goal of AQAP eradication 
the Saleh regime must be removed from power.  This goes against long-held doctrine and 
the current National Security Strategy of the United States which states we should work 
with failing states and assist in their rebuilding and redevelopment.  In this case we 
contend that assistance in this redevelopment will come after we have assisted, actively 
and passively, to the demise of the Saleh regime.  The regime’s removal will allow the 
international community to assist in rebuilding the country and allow access to the 
regions within Yemen that are currently off limits to those wanting to identify and 
destroy AQAP through legitimate means.   
 Our findings are a framework to begin working towards a Yemen that is free from 
AQAP influence, but does not sufficiently cover all aspects of considerations needed for 
implementation.  Further study into consequence management and force preparation are 
necessary before implementing the course of action recommend. 
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